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JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann* § 7 8-2a-3(2).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Should the trial court's findings of fact be affirmed

because Appellants West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4
(FOP) and Jim Crowley failed to marshal the evidence that supports
the findings of fact?
a.

Standard of Appellate Review,

The trial court's

findings of fact are reviewed under the
erroneous" standard.
Civil Procedure.

"clearly

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of

A finding is considered "clearly

erroneous" when, based upon the entire evidence,
the

reviewing

court

has

a

firm

conviction that a mistake was made.
Peterson,
order

and

definite

Peterson

v.

818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991).
to demonstrate

clearly

that

factual

erroneous, Appellants

must

In

findings

are

marshal

the

evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and
then show that those findings are so lacking in
support as to be clearly erroneous.

City

v. Majestic

Investment

(Utah App. 1991).

Company,

West

Valley

818 P. 2d 1311

If Appellants fail to marshal

all of the evidence in support of the findings of
fact,

the

conclusive

trial
and

court's

should

1

not

findings
be

of

fact

disturbed.

are
West

Valley

City

Department

v.
of

Majestic,

Employment

at
Security,

2.

v.

188 Utah Adv.

Rep. 40, 4 2 (Utah App. 1992); Morton
Mutual,

Bhatla

1313;

v.

Gem

State

794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990).

Is there sufficient evidence in the Record to support the

trial court's findings of fact?
a.

Standard of Appellate Review.

The appellate court

views the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Harllne

judgment of the trial court.
728 P. 2d 980 (Utah 1986).

Campbell,

v.

Findings of fact will

not be disturbed by the appellate courts unless
there is no substantial evidence in the Record to
Bennion

support the findings.

v. Hansen,

699 P.2d

757 (Utah 1985) .

FOP

3.

Did the trial court correctly deteritiiine that Appellant

did

not

have

standing

to

bring

this

action

in

its

representative capacity?
a.

Standard of Appellate Review.

The trial court's

conclusions of law are reviewed independently by
the appellate court for correctness.
Perry,

819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Scharf

Corporation,
4.
Crowley

Did
did

the
not

Eskelsen

trial
have

v.

v. BMG

700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
court

correctly

standing

individual?

2

to

decide

bring

this

that

Plaintiff

action

as

an

a.

Standard of Review.

The trial court's conclusions

of law are reviewed independently by the appellate
court for correctness.

Eskelsen,

Scharf,

at 771;

at 1070.
5.

Did the trial court correctly decided that Appellants FOP

and Crowley did not have standing to bring an action in the nature
of an extraordinary writ?
a.

Standard of Review.

The trial court's conclusions

of law are reviewed independently by the appellate
court for correctness.

Eskelsen,

Scharf,

at 771;

at 1070.
6.

Can Appellants FOP and Crowley appeal the trial court's

denial of William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion for Joinder?
a.

Standard of Review.
court

decisions

which

Farmers'

appellant.
Waterman,

Parties cannot appeal trial
are

not

Loan

to

the

Trust

Co.

v.

and

106 U.S. 265 (1882); Utility

Association

of New Jersey,

Inc.

v.

83 (3rd Cir. 1974); International
Teamsters,
America,

adverse

Chauffeurs
Local

v. Keystone

r

Union No.

Freight

Lines,

Stablemen
523,
Inc.,

of

Contractors

Toops,

507 F.2d

Brotherhood
and
Tulsa,

Helpers

of
of

Oklahoma,

123 F.2d 326 (10th

Cir. 1941).
7.

Did the trial court correctly deny William Salmon and

David Shopay's Motion for Joinder?

3

a.

Standard of Review.

The trial court's conclusions

of law are reviewed independently by the appellate
court for correctness.

Eskelsen,

Scharf,

at 771;

at 1070.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by the FOP, an association, and Jim
Crowley, an individual Police Officer, to review the actions and
decisions of the West Valley City Civil Service Commission and the
West Valley City Police Department with respect to an examination
for promotion

to

Sergeant

that

occurred

in July,

1989.

The

Complaint, Amended Complaint and Corrected Amended Complaint all
sought to have the results of the promotion examination nullified,
and the Commission and Police Chief ordered

to conduct a new,

different promotional process.
A.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

The original Complaint was filed on December 21, 1989.
1990,

Plaintiffs

conducted

discovery

by

way

of

During

depositions,

interrogatories and requests for production of documents.

During

February, 1991, the FOP and Crowley filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Commission and Nordfelt filed a Motion to Dismiss
for

Lack

of

Standing.

All

parties

provided

the

court

with

affidavits and documents in support of their respective positions.
In March, 1991, William Salmon and David Shopay, West Valley City
Police Officers, filed a Motion for Joinder to join the action as
plaintiffs.

On August

23, 1991, the court held a hearing on

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion to
4

Dismiss.

At

that hearing, the trial court denied

Plaintiffs'

Motion for Summary Judgment, and took Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
under advisement.

Following the hearing, the parties were allowed

to again supplement the Record by way of additional memoranda and
affidavits.
B.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE TRIAL
COURT.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss was a facial and factual attack
on the standing of the FOP and Crowley to bring this action.

The

Motion was made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (Exhibit C) .

The Appellants, while acknowledging that

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
incorrectly provide the court with the standard and case citations
that

relate

12(b)(6).

to

motions

to

dismiss

brought

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18.)

pursuant

to

Rule

The two types of

motions have different standards and are not interchangeable.
The relevant case law clearly distinguishes between motions
made under Rule 12(b)(6) and other Rule 12(b) motions.

This Court

may look to the federal courts for assistance in determining the
proper

interpretation

Winegar

v.

Slim

Olson,

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

252 P. 2d 205 (Utah 1953).

Civil

Procedure.

12(b)(6) motions

alone necessitate a ruling on the merits of the claim; the other
available motions, including a 12(b)(1) motion such as this, deal
with procedural defects.
Loan

Association,

Mortensen

549 F. 2d 884

v.

First

(1977),

Federal

Savings

The Mortensen

explains that there are two types of 12(b)(1) motions.

decision
First,

there are motions which attack the complaint on its face.
5

and

The

facial

attack

offers

safeguards

similar

to

those

found

in

a

12(b)(6) motion in that the court must consider the allegations and
Mortensen,

evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff.

at 891.

The second type of 12(b)(1) motion discussed in Mortensen
a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction.

is

The court stated

that:
Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion
is the trial court's jurisdiction -- its very
power to hear the case -- there is substantial
authority that the trial court is free to
weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to
the existence of its power to hear the case.
In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches
to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence
of disputed material facts will not preclude
the trial court from evaluating for itself the
merits of jurisdictional claims.
Moreover,
the plaintiff will have the burden of proof
that jurisdiction does in fact exist.
Mortensen,

at 891 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Adams

v. Bain,

69 7

F.2d 1213 (1982), came to a similar conclusion regarding a 12(b)(1)
motion

and

stated that, "The burden of proving

subject matter

jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss is on the plaintiff, the party
asserting jurisdiction.

The trial court may consider evidence by

affidavit, depositions or live testimony without converting the
proceeding to one for summary judgment."

Adams,

The United States Supreme Court, in Warth
490,

45

L.Ed.2d

343,

95

S.

Ct.

2197

at 1219.

v. Seldin,

(1975),

a

422 U.S.
case

cited

approvingly by Plaintiffs, states that in ruling upon a motion to
dismiss for lack of standing:
. . . it is within the trial court's power to
allow or to require the plaintiff to supply,
6

by
amendment
to
the
complaint
or
by
affidavits, further particularized allegations
of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's
standing.
If, after this opportunity, the
plaintiff's
standing does not adequately
appear from all materials of record, the
complaint must be dismissed.
Warthr

at 45 L.Ed.2d 356 (emphasis added).
It

is

the

trial

court's

prerogative

to

examine

all

the

evidence that had been presented by both parties during the course
of

the

litigation.

In addition to the evidence presented

in

conjunction with Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the court
allowed Plaintiffs two opportunities to provide additional evidence
specifically on the standing issue.
response

to

Defendants'

Motion

The first opportunity came in
to

Dismiss,

and

the

second

opportunity came by way of supplemental memoranda and affidavits
submitted following oral argument on the standing issue. The trial
court concluded that Plaintiffs had presented the court with

no

evidence which established standing, and based its findings of fact
upon the substantial body of evidence submitted by Defendants by
way of documents and affidavits relating specific facts based upon
personal knowledge.
C.

DISPOSITION.

The court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding,
issued a ruling on November 15, 1991, granting Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss and denying the Motion for Joinder.

Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in this action were entered
by the trial court on March 26, 1992. From that trial court Order,
the FOP and Crowley now appeal on issues of fact and law.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO
MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS
THE
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The FOP and Crowley's Brief fails to marshal the evidence that
supports the finding of fact of the trial court.

Each disputed

finding of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence in
the Record; however, the FOP and Crowley only provide the court
with argument and evidence which support their position.

Because

of

court's

their

utter

failure

to

comply

with

the

appellate

procedural standards, the trial court's findings of fact should be
conclusive and should not be disturbed,
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE WITH RELIANCE
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.
The trial court in this case made 16 specific findings of
fact.

Each of those facts is based upon substantial, competent

evidence contained in the Record and presented to the trial court
by all parties.

The Commission and Nordfelt's argument provides

specific examples of evidence, cited to the Record, which support
each finding of fact being disputed by Appellants.

8

POINT III
PLAINTIFF FOP DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING
THIS SUIT IN ITS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY SINCE
THERE EXIST OBVIOUS CONFLICTS AMONG ITS
MEMBERS.
The Commission and Nordfelt contend that the FOP cannot meet
the

association

standing

Supreme Court in Warth

v.

test set forth by the United
Seldin,

States

422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed. 2d 343, 95

S. Ct. 2197 (1975); and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in

Restaurant
1159

Association

(Utah

Bullock,

v.

Davis

County Board of Health,

1985); and Society

of

743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987).

Professional

Utah

709 P. 2d

Journalists

v.

The trial court found that the

FOP did not have standing, either on the face of the Complaint or
after an investigation of the facts of the case.
within the FOP are numerous and obvious.

The FOP has named one of

its own members, Nordfelt, as a Defendant.
its

own

members

as

hostile

witnesses.

The conflicts

Also, it has deposed
And,

if

the

FOP

is

successful in this action, the result would be a loss of property
rights for certain FOP members, who are not parties, who would be
demoted from their positions as Sergeant.
POINT IV
APPELLANT CROWLEY SUFFERED NO INJURY, AND,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING
THIS ACTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
The trial court correctly found that Crowley has suffered no
particularized injury as a result of the actions of the Commission
and Nordfelt, and, therefore, did not have standing to bring this
suit.

Crowley failed to pass the written examination for promotion

to Sergeant.

Crowley's failure on the written test is fatal to his
9

standing,

since

that

promoted to Sergeant.

failure

alone

precluded

him

from

being

Even if all of Crowley's allegations were

true, his failure on the test eliminated him from any possibility
of being promoted.

Therefore, he could not have been injured by

any actions of the Commission or Nordfelt.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT STANDING TEST.
The trial court applied a third standing test to the FOP and
Crowley.

This test was set forth in the Society

of

Journalists

case, and applies to actions for extraordinary writs.

In this

case, the Complaint filed by the FOP and Crowley may be considered
to be an extraordinary writ under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, since it is asking the trial court to review and direct
the actions of a lower board, the Civil Service; Commission, and a
public officer, the Police Chief.

The trial court correctly found

that the FOP could not meet the extraordinary writ standing test,
because

it

did

not

have

standing

before

the

Civil

Service

Commission due to its obvious conflicts of interest which are
discussed under Point III.

Also, the ruling of the Civil Service

Commission was not adverse to the FOP, and the FOP

failed

to

present its claims to the lower body, the Commission.
Crowley also fails to meet this test, since he lacked standing
to proceed before the Commission on the same basis that he lacked
standing to proceed before the trial court, as is set forth in
Point IV.

Also, he did not suffer an injury as a result of the

10

Commission or Nordfelt's actions, and, therefore, the rulings of
the Commission were not adverse to Crowley.
POINT VI
APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALMON
AND SHOPAY'S MOTION FOR JOINDER
IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AND SAID MOTION
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The FOP and Crowley are clearly not the proper parties to
bring an appeal of the denial of Salmon and Shopay's Motion for
Joinder.

The denial of that Motion did not affect the standing or

rights of the FOP or Crowley, and is adverse only to Salmon and
Shopay.

Salmon and Shopay are not parties to this appeal.

Assuming that the FOP and Crowley can bring an appeal of the
denial of Salmon and Shopay's Motion for Joinder, the trial court's
denial of that Motion was correct.

Once the trial court had

determined that the FOP and Crowley did not have standing, the
trial court's only course of action was to dismiss the original
Complaint.

Once that Complaint had been dismissed, the Motion for

Joinder became moot.

In effect, once the trial court determined

that the FOP and Crowley did not have standing, the court had no
jurisdiction to grant a Motion for Joinder, since there was no
action to join.
Motions to join are permissive, and it was within the sound
discretion of the trial court to deny the Motion for Joinder.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On June 6, 1989, the West Valley City Police Department

issued a memorandum notice announcing a promotional examination for
the position of Sergeant in the West Valley City Police Department
11

(Exhibit N ) .
necessary
provided

(R. 006) This notice set forth the qualifications

to compete
information

for the position
regarding

the

of Sergeant,

testing

and also

process.

More

specifically, the notice stated that:
a.

The passing grade for all tests was 75 percent.
(R. 006, 185)

b.

The applicant

must

be off probation.

(R. 006)

This meant that the applicant was required to have
one or more years of service with West Valley City
before qualifying for promotion, since the Civil
Service Commission Rules establish the probationary
period as one year.
c.

(R. 282, 286)

The written examination was to be conducted first,
and the top 15 candidates with a passing score on
the written examination would be invited to attend
a two-day assessment center.

2.

(R. 006, 185)

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1010 and Rule III-l, West Valley

City Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual, provide

that

promotion shall be made from members of the next lower rank, when
practicable (Exhibit E ) .
3.

(R. 284)

The rank immediately below Sergeant in the West Valley

City Police Department is Police Officer.

Within the rank of

Police Officer, there are three subdivisions known as "grades"

—

Police Officer I ("P.O. I"), Police Officer 3 1 ("P.O. II")

and

Police Officer III ("P.O. Ill") (Exhibits F, G and J ) .
277, 279, 283-285)
12

(R. 109,

4.

On previous tests for the rank of Sergeant, the Civil

Service Commission limited the applicant pool to those individuals
with the grades of P.O. II or P.O. Ill within the rank of Police
Officer.
5.

(R. 310)
On or about June

6,

19 89, Defendant

Dennis

Nordfelt

requested, in writing, Civil Service Commission approval to change
the qualification criteria to allow P.O. I officers with sufficient
seniority to qualify as P.O. II officers to test for the Sergeant
position.

Nordfelt made this request because there were several

P.O. I officers with sufficient experience and time in service to
be promoted to P.O. II positions, who had not been promoted due to
budgetary constraints.
6.

(R. 110, 279-280)

Nordfelt's request was forwarded to Guy Kimball, Civil

Service Commission Chairman, who then consulted with the other
members of the Commission.

(R. 123-124)

The Commission approved

the Police Department's change in the qualification criteria, and
P.O. I officers with sufficient experience and time in service to
be P.O. II officers, who had not been promoted due to budgetary
constraints, were allowed to compete for the position of Sergeant.
(R. 110, 123)
7.

On July 20, 1989, the written promotional examination was

given to those qualified

applicants who appeared

for testing.

(R. 006, 008, 185)
8.

Plaintiff

Jim

Crowley

took

the

written

promotional

examination and received a score below the passing grade of 75
percent.

(R. 185, 338)

Crowley
13

did

not

participate

in

the

remainder of the promotional process due to his failure to pass the
written examination.
9.

The

percent) on

top

15

officers

with

the written examination

assessment center.
10.

(R. 185, 338)
passing

grades

participated

(above

in a

75

two-day

(R. 006, 008)

Following the examination process, a promotional roster

was issued and the top two officers were promoted to the rank of
Sergeant.

Those two officers were Charles Illsley and Guy Dodge.

(R. 181, 186)
11.

On July 1, 1991, Officer Craig Gibson was promoted from

the promotional roster to the rank of Sergeant.
12.

(R. 183)

In August, 1991, the Sergeant's promotional roster became

invalid due to the fact that it was more than two years old.

Utah

Code Ann. § 10-3-1009.
13.

On August 23, 1989, a group of Police Officers addressed

the Civil Service Commission in writing, asking the Commission to
"look

into"

what

they

promotional process.
14.

perceived

to

be

improprieties

in

the

(R. 010)

The Civil Service Commission investigated the officers'

complaints by making inquiries of Police Department administrative
personnel and directing the City Personnel Department to evaluate
test data.
issued

a

(R. 013)
letter

Following the investigation, the Commission

responding

to

the

officers'

complaints

upholding the validity of the promotional roster.
15.

On

December

21, 1989, Plaintiffs

Complaint in this action.

(R. 002-014)
14

filed

and

(R. 013)
the

original

During 1991, Plaintiffs

pursued

various

means

of

discovery,

including

Interrogatories

(R. 024, 041) and Requests for Production of Documents
041).

Plaintiffs

also

took

depositions

from

the

(R. 023,
following

individuals (R. 47-48):
a.

Defendant Dennis Nordfelt (R. 61-62), West Valley
City

Police

Chief

and

member

of

Plaintiff

association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 175176, 186).
b.

J.

Stephen

Assistant

Shreeve
Police

(R. 59-60), West Valley

Chief

and

member

of

City

Plaintiff

association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 186,
189).

Shreeve was involved

in formulating

administering the promotional process.
c.

and

(R. 189)

Larry L Moody (R. 92-93), West Valley City Police
Department

Lieutenant

and

member

of

Plaintiff

association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 178,
186).

Moody

was

involved

in

formulating

administering the promotional process.
d.

Guy

Dodge

(R. 50-51),

West

Valley

and

(R. 17 8)
City

Police

Officer promoted to Sergeant as a result of the
July,

1989

Sergeant's

promotional

examination

(R. 186), and member of Plaintiff association, the
Fraternal Order of Police (R. 186).
e.

Sue

(Mooney) Pipkin (R. 55-56), West Valley City

Police Department Executive Secretary (R. 135).
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.

f.

Guy

Kimball,

West

Valley

Commission Chairman.
g.

Don

Meyers,

h.

Elaine

Service

Valley

City

Civil

Service

Civil

Service

(R. 68-69)

Powell,

Commissioner.
i.

Civil

(R. 63-65)

West

Commissioner.

City

West

Valley

City

(R. 66-67)

Cory Ervin (R. 52-54), Personnel Generalist in the
West Valley City Personnel Office and Secretary to
the

West

Valley

City

Civil

Service

Commission

(R. 184-185, 281-282).
16.

On

or

about

February

15,

1991,

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
17.

On

or

about

February

19,

Plaintiffs

(R. 94-95)
1991,

Defendants

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing.
18.

On or about March

Officers

David

Joinder.

Shopay

and

filed

filed

(R. 162-163)

28, 1991, West Valley City Police
William

Salmon

filed

a Motion

for

(R. 216-217)

19.

Following the submission of memoranda, affidavits and

documents by the parties, on August 23, 1991, the Court held a
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 264)

denied

Motion

Plaintiffs'

At that hearing, the trial court
for

Summary

Judgment,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under advisement.

and

took

(R. 313)

Both

parties were allowed to supplement the record by way of additional
memoranda

and

affidavits.

(R. 379)

Plaintiffs

filed

a

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and
16

additional affidavits.

(R. 330-339, 344-358)

reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum.
20.

Defendants filed a
(R. 362-370)

On November 15, 1991, the trial court issued its ruling

granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, denying Defendants' Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memoranda and denying the Motion
for Joinder (Exhibit A ) .
21.

(R. 428-430)

On March 26, 199 2, the trial court entered its Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in this action
(Exhibit B ) .

(R. 438)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO
MARSHAL
THE
EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS
THE
FINDINGS OF FACT.
The trial court's findings of fact that support its ruling are
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

A

finding

is

Rule 52(a), Utah

considered

"clearly

erroneous" when, based upon the entire evidence, the reviewing
court has a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made.
Peterson

v.

Peterson,

818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991).

court has consistently

held that in order to demonstrate

This
that

factual findings are clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal
all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then
show that those findings are so lacking in support as to be clearly

erroneous.
P.2d

at

West

1313.

Valley

City

v. Majestic

Investment

Company,

818

The marshaling requirement allows the court to

consider the findings of fact from the standpoint of the supporting
17

evidence, and not from the appellants' view of how the facts should
have been found.
While

Plaintiffs

marshaling
utterly

Saunders

to

Sharp,

793 P. 2d 927 (Utah App. 1990).

acknowledge

requirement

fails

v.

and give

lip service

to the

(Appellants' Brief, p, 3 ) , their

provide

this

Court

supported the trial court's decision.

with

the

evidence

Brief
which

If this Court were forced to

decide the issues based solely upon Appellants' Brief, the Court
would be entirely unable to determine whether or not there is any
evidence

to

support

the

trial

court's

findings

and

decision.

Appellants have consistently emphasized or stated only the evidence
which supports their position, and have left it to the Court to
determine what evidence provided the basis for the trial court's
ruling.

Therefore, the trial court's findings of fact should be
Department

of

188 Utah Adv. Rep., at 42; Horton v. Gem

State

conclusive and should not be disturbed.

Employment
Mutual,

Security,

Bhatia

v.

794 P.2d at 849.

Also, Appellants' Brief fails to present the evidence in the
proper light.

"Under familiar rules of appellate review, the Court

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of
the trial court . . . . "
Bennlon

v.

Hansen,

Harllne

v.

699 P. 2d, at 759.

Campbell,

728 P.2d, at 982;

The Supreme Court in

Harline

also stated, "It is incumbent upon the appellant to marshal all of
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then to
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most favorable to
the

factual

determination

made

18

by

the

trial

court, that

the

evidence
omitted.)

is insufficient
Harline,

to support

its

findings."

(Footnote

at 982.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE WITH RELIANCE
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT.
The trial court in this case made numerous specific findings
of fact (Exhibit A ) .

(R. 431-433)

Each of those facts is based

upon evidence presented to the trial court by all parties.
findings will not be disturbed

unless there is no

record evidence to support them.

Bennion,

their

selective

recitation

of

the

at 759.
facts,

Those

substantial

Notwithstanding

Appellants'

Brief

completely fails to carry the burden of demonstrating that the
trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
The trial court made 16 specific findings of fact.
433)

(R. 431-

Plaintiffs specifically attack findings no. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10

and 11.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-22, 26, 39.)

Each of these

findings of fact is supported by the following competent evidence:
A.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 2: ONE YEAR OF SERVICE WITH THE WEST
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BE
ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT. (R. 432)

The fact that one year of service with West Valley City was
required

in

order

to

qualify

for

promotion

to

unquestioned, despite Appellants' statement that,

Sergeant

is

"There is no

evidence in the record indicating that the probationary period was
one year," (Appellants' Brief, p. 22). The June 6, 1989 memorandum
which stated the qualifications for promotion clearly states that
candidates

"must be off probation"
19

(Exhibit N. )

(R. 006)

The

trial court was presented with competent evidence which indicated
that the probationary period for West Valley City Civil Service
employees is one year.

The Civil Service Rules clearly state, in

Rule 11-32(2), that, "All Civil Service employees shall serve a
one-year probation."

(Exhibit E.)

(R. 286) Also, Cory Ervin, who

worked in the West Valley City Personnel Office and who also served
as Civil Service Commission Secretary, swore by Affidavit that,
"Based upon my experience as Civil Service Secretary and Personnel
Generalist, I have personal knowledge that Police Officers are
required to have at least one year of service with the West Valley
City Police Department prior to being removed from probation."
(Exhibit G.)

(R. 282-283)

Appellants' Brief presents no evidence

to dispute the existence of the one-year probationary period, and
instead

relies

on

the

totally

unsupported

allegation

that

"a

requirement that all candidates have one year of service with the
Department

is

not

adequate

consideration

of

seniority."

(Appellants' Brief, p. 23.)
B.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 3: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMOTION TO
SERGEANT REQUIRED THAT APPLICANTS HOLD THE RANK OF POLICE
OFFICER WITHIN THE WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT.
(R. 432)

C.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 4:
WITHIN THE RANK OF POLICE
OFFICER, ALL GRADES (P.O. I, P.O. II AND P.O. Ill) WERE
ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT, WITH NO GRADE
PREFERENCE GIVEN TO THE MEMBERS OF ANY ONE GRADE.
(R. 432)

Appellants' Brief does not directly attack the factual basis
of these two related findings of fact, but instead argues that,
" . . . only officers of the next lower rank, P.O. II, be allowed to
compete for the promotion."

(Appellants' Brief, p. 24.)
20

While

Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission readily agree that both
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1010 and Civil Service Rule III-l (Exhibit E)
provide that promotions should be made from the next lower rank
when practicable, there was no evidence presented to the trial
court that P.O. II was the next lower rank beneath Sergeant.

The

evidence presented to the trial court, which Plaintiffs have failed
to marshal, fully

supports the trial court's finding that the

applicants for promotion to Sergeant were required to hold the rank
of Police Officer, and that within the rank of Police Officer there
existed

three

grades.

The

Civil

Service

Rules

clearly

differentiate between ranks and grades. Civil Service Rules III-2,
III-6 and III-7 define promotions in grade and promotions in rank,
and describe the differences between the two (Exhibit E ) .
285)

(R. 284-

Also, the Affidavit of Terry Keefe (Exhibit J ) , West Valley

City Assistant Police Chief, sets forth the following evidence:
4.
I have personal knowledge that in
the West Valley City Police Department the
rank immediately below Sergeant is the rank of
Police Officer.
5.
I have personal knowledge that only
officers holding the rank of Police Officer
were promoted to Sergeant following the 1989
Promotional Examination.
6.
I have personal knowledge that the
rank structure in the West Valley City Police
Department is set forth in the West Valley
City Police Manual at Section 1700.23, and
that a copy of this rank structure is issued
to every officer within the Department.
7.
I have personal knowledge that
within the rank of Police Officer there are
three grades consisting of Police Officer I,
Police Officer II and Police Officer III.
8.
I have personal knowledge that job
duties within the rank of Police Officer are
essentially similar, involve no supervisory
duties and do not vary based upon an officer's
21

grade designation
P.O. III.
(R. 279)

as a P.O.

I, P.O.

II or

Section 1700.23 of the West Valley City Police Department

Manual (Exhibit F ) , which is referred to in I 6 of the Affidavit of
Terry Keefe, states:
Rank structure is the hierarchial arrangement
of ranks within the Department. The ranks of
this Department are .Listed below in descending
order:
Police Chief
Lieutenant
Sergeant
Police Officer
(R. 277)

Also, the Affidavit of Cory Ervin, Personnel Generalist

and Civil Service Commission Secretary (Exhibit G ) , states:
9.
Based upon my experience as Civil
Service Secretary and Personnel Generalist, I
have personal knowledge that Police Officer is
the rank immediately below Sergeant in the
West Valley City Police Department.
10. Based upon my experience as Civil
Service Secretary and Personnel Generalist, I
have personal knowledge that the rank of
Police Officer in the West Valley City Police
Department is divided into grades known as
Police Officer I, Police Officer II and Police
Officer III.
(R. 282-283)
None of this supporting evidence was marhsaled by the FOP and
Crowley, nor do they present any evidence, other than unsupported
allegations, which contradicts the finding of the trial court.
Plaintiffs provide absolutely no factual basis for their argument
that the finding of fact is wrong because the rank below Sergeant
is the rank of P.O. II.

Their argument arises from a complete

misstatement of the rank structure within the Police Department.
22

They wrongly point to the grades of P.O. I and P.O. II as "ranks."
These are clearly not ranks, but are grades within the rank of
Police Officer.
are

easily

As set forth in the Civil Service Rules, grades

differentiated

from

ranks

in that grade

status

is

primarily related to salary level, not job duties, and a change
from the grade of P.O. I to P.O. II requires no change in job
duties or position within the Department (Exhibit E ) .

(R. 284-285)

The functions of P.O. I and P.O. II officers are the same, and one
is not supervisory or superior to the other.

(R. 279)

Conversely,

changes in rank are characterized by a substantial change in job
duties, such as the supervisory responsibilities that differentiate
a Sergeant from a Police Officer.

(R. 285)

By making this argument that P.O. II is a "rank," the FOP and
Crowley have painted themselves into a corner which demonstrates
the

absurdity

of

their position.

They completely

existence of the P.O. Ill grade officers.

ignore

the

The FOP and Crowley's

failure to recognize P.O. Ill officers places them in a dilemma.
If their argument that P.O. II grade officers constitute a "rank"
is assumed to be correct, then they have again ignored the facts
when

they

skip

over

immediately

below

version

the

of

P.O.

Sergeant

ranking

Ill's

is P.O.

structure

Sergeant would be P.O. III.

and

assert

II.
the

that

Under
rank

the

their

"rank"

mistaken

immediately

under

If this were true, then Crowley is

arguing that he is ineligible to take the Sergeants promotional
examination since he is a P.O. II officer and would not be "from
the next lower rank."

(R. 337)
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The FOP and Crowley surely know that P.O. II is not the "rank"
immediately below Sergeant.

Appellants are all West Valley City

Police Officers who possess the departmental manual and Commission
Rules which set forth the rank and grade system.

They presented

the trial court with no evidence regarding the rank structure in
the Police Department.

Clearly, this argument is not made in good

faith.
D.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 7: PLAINTIFF CROWLEY DID NOT RECEIVE
THE MINIMUM REQUIRED PASSING SCORE ON THE WRITTEN
EXAMINATION AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT PROCEED FURTHER IN
THE PROMOTIONAL PROCESS. (R. 432)

Crowley admits that the Affidavit of Cory Ervin, Personnel
Generalist
evidence

and

which

Civil

Service

supported

Commission

this

(Appellants' Brief, p. 37.)

finding

Secretary,

of

fact

provided

(Exhibit G ) .

Ervin stated in her Affidavit that she

was the custodian of all records of the West Valley City Civil
Service

Commission,

and

that

the

Commission

records

in

her

possession indicated that the minimum passing score on the written
examination was a score of 75 percent.

She also indicated that

Plaintiff Crowley applied for and took the written examination, but
that he did

not receive

therefore, did
process.

not

a score of

advance

to

75 percent or above

the next

phase

of

the

and,

testing

(R. 185)

Crowley fails, however, to marshal the regaining supporting
evidence.

For example, he omits his own sworn statement which

supports this finding.

As Crowley stated in his Second Affidavit,

"I failed to pass the written examination by 1 point and was not
allowed to proceed to the next level of consideration."
24

(R. 338)

Crowley attempts to demonstrate that this finding of fact is
clearly

erroneous

by

directing

the

Court's

attention

to

the

promotional examination announcements, which he asserts are better
evidence

than

Ervin's

sworn

statement.

Based

on

the

two

promotional announcement memoranda, Crowley now argues that there
was no minimum passing score and that the top 15 scores on the
written

examination

would

(Appellants' Brief, p. 37.)

advance

to

the

assessment

center,

This is patently untrue, as can be

demonstrated by examining the documents upon which he relies.

The

June 6, 19 89 memorandum announcing the promotional examination for
Sergeant clearly and unequivocally states in 5 1, line 3, that,
"Passing grade for all tests will be set at 75%."
(R. 006)

(Exhibit N. )

Also, on the second page of the June 6 memorandum, under

the heading "Assessment Center," appears the following statement:
"Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the written
examination will be invited to attend a two-day assessment center."
(Emphasis added.)

(R. 007) The documents cited by Crowley support

the finding of fact.
Crowley produced no evidence or argument before the trial
court that the minimum passing score was not 75 percent.
E.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 8: PLAINTIFF CROWLEY DID NOT SUFFER
A DISTINCT, PARTICULARIZED AND PALPABLE INJURY RELATED TO
THE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS. (R. 432)

This finding of fact is supported by the same evidence which
supports the other findings of fact related to Plaintiff Crowley.
Crowley believes that, "The trial court's misperception that a
minimum passing score existed is the primary reason that finding
25

no. 8 is erroneous."

(Appellants' Brief, p. 38.)

As was shown in

H D above ("Finding of Fact No. 7"), the trial court's finding that
Crowley did not receive the minimum required passing score of 75
percent

on

the

written

examination

is

supported

finding

fact,

by

evidence

contained in the Record.
In

attacking

this

of

Crowley

makes

the

additional argument that he has established evidence of injury by
alleging

that

process.

seniority was not considered

in the

promotional

He provided the court with absolutely no evidence to

support this bare allegation, and his citations to the Record are
simply

to where

the

same

allegation

is made

in

Complaint, the Amended Complaint and his Affidavit.
Brief, p. 38; R. 6-9, 113-118, 339.)

the

original

(Appellants'

While Crowley admits that,

"Seniority may be considered in myriad ways" (Appellants' Brief, p.
38), he completely ignores the court's finding of fact and the
evidence which supports it, which clearly indicates that one year
of service (seniority) with the West Valley City Police Department
was

required

as

a

threshold

qualification

for

entering

the

examination process. Crowley has provided this Court with no basis
upon which

it can find that finding of fact no. 8 is clearly

erroneous.
F.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 10: MEMBERS OF PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4 ("FOP") DID NOT SUFFER
DISTINCT, PARTICULARIZED AND PALPABLE INJURY RELATED TO
THE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS. (R. 433)

Plaintiff FOP attempts to demonstrate that this finding of
fact is clearly erroneous by providing the Court with a laundry
list of the allegations contained in their Complaint.
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(Appellants'

Brief,

pp.

specific

24-26.)

facts

requirement
Washington

of

are
a

County

Conclusory
not

sufficient

particularized
Elected

allegations
to meet

injury,

Officials,

not
the

York

supported
standing

test

Unqualified

v.

714 P. 2d 679

by

(Utah 1986).

Despite conducting discovery and having multiple opportunities to
present evidence to the trial court, the FOP produced virtually no
evidence to support its standing to bring this action.

To the

contrary, Defendants provided the trial court with evidence upon
which it could base its decision that the FOP did not suffer an
injury that would provide it with standing in this case.
Much of the evidence, which has been set out previously in
support of the other challenged findings of fact, support this
finding.

For example, the fact that one year of

service was

required in the testing process provides the Court with a basis for
determining that the FOP was not injured through the lack or the
use of
clearly

seniority

in the testing process.

established

and

the

trial

court

Also, the
found

that

evidence
the

immediately below Sergeant is the rank of Police Officer.

rank
That

evidence supports the court's determination that the FOP was not
injured when all three grades within the rank of Police Officer
were allowed

to compete

for promotion.

Virtually all of

the

remaining allegations regarding injuries suffered by the FOP relate
back to the seniority and rank issues for which they can provide no
factual support.
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Plaintiff

FOP

has

failed

to provide

this

Court with

any

evidence upon which it could find trial court's finding of fact no.
10 to be clearly erroneous.
G.

FINDING OF FACT NO. 11: PLAINTIFF FOP DID NOT PRESENT
ITS CLAIMS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PRIOR TO THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THIS LAWSUIT. (R. 433)

As the FOP and Crowley's Brief acknowledges, the Affidavit of
Cory Ervin establishes that as custodian of the records of the
Civil Service Commission she has no knowledge or record of the
Commission receiving any communication from Plaintiff FOP regarding
the 1989 Sergeants examination, nor does she have any record or
knowledge of the Commission transmitting any information to the FOP
regarding

the

examination,

with

the

exception

of

information

supplied in connection with this lawsuit (Exhibit G) . (R. 184-186)
Appellant FOP now makes the strained argument that the August
23, 1989, letter to the Civil Service Commission, which was signed
by a group of officers, constituted an appearance by the FOP,

This

argument is made despite the fact that the letter itself is not on
FOP

letterhead,

nor

does

the

body

of

the

letter

contain

any

representation whatsoever that the officers are acting as the FOP,
on behalf of the FOP or are even all members of the FOP.

(R. 010)

Even Crowley, President of the FOP, simply states the following in
his Affidavit:
19. I signed a letter to the Commission
objecting to the procedure followed in the
Sergeants promotion evaluation process.
(R. 339)

The fact that Crowley does not indicate that the letter

was signed in his capacity as FOP President, as a FOP member or in
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any manner on behalf of the FOP is a clear indication that the
August 23, 1989 letter was submitted to the Commission on behalf of
the individual officers who signed the letter.

This comports with

the language of the letter itself, where the officers simply refer
to themselves as "we the undersigned officers of West Valley City."
(R. 010)

Although many or all of the signees of the letter may

have been FOP members, that certainly does not make it an action of
the FOP as is now being suggested.
Plaintiff FOP makes a sidebar argument that there existed no
process by which the FOP could have improprieties in the testing
process reviewed by the Civil Service Commission.

This argument is

obviously absurd, since the 30 officers who signed the August 23,
1989 letter did successfully bring alleged improprieties to the
Commission and received a response from the Commission following
the

Commission's

investigation.

(R.

10-13)

By

making

this

argument, the FOP is in the ludicrous position of simultaneously
arguing

that

no

process

exists

for

presenting

claims

to

the

Commission, and that they did, in fact, present their claim to the
Commission.
The Affidavit of Cory Ervin supplies support for the court's
finding of fact, and Plaintiff FOP has provided this Court with no
evidence from which it could find that finding of fact no. 11 is
clearly erroneous.
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF FOP DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING
THIS SUIT IN ITS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY SINCE
THERE EXIST OBVIOUS CONFLICTS AMONG ITS
MEMBERS.
The test to determine whether or not an association such as
Plaintiff FOP has standing to bring an action in its representative
capacity

is

Association

set

v. Davis

1985), and Society
1166

forth

in

County

two

Restaurant

709 P.2d 1159 (Utah

Journalists

These two decisions

Utah

cases,

Board of Health,

of Professional

(Utah 1987).

Utah

v. Bullock,
follow the

743 P.2d

association

standing test set by the United States Supreme Court in Warth
Seldin,

422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).

three

cases

mentioned

above

set

forth

a

two-prong

test

v.
The
for

determining when an association can represent its members in court.
The first prong of the test is that the individual members of the
association must have standing to sue.

The second prong of the

test is that the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does
not require the individual participation of each injured party.
The Utah Supreme Court, in its cases adopting the Warth

test,

provides insight as to what is necessary to meet this standing
test.
the

Specifically with respect to the second prong of the test,

relief

sought

by

the

association

must

not

individual participation of each injured party.

Society

of Professional

Journalists,

require

the

The court, in

found that the Society met the

second prong of the test, since " . . . the relief it sought would
have benefitted all its members . . . . " (emphasis added); and,
" . • . the association was fully capable of presenting to the
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district court the factual and legal access issues about which its

Society

members were concerned."
In the Utah

1175.

Restaurant

of Professional

Journalists,

at

case, the Supreme Court found the

plaintiff association to have met the second prong of the test
because, "The questions raised as to the validity of the Board's
enactment

are

common

to

all

Davis

County

members

of

the

Association" (emphasis added); and, "Nothing suggests that their
individual interests will not be adequately protected

Utah Restaurant

Association,

. . . ."

at 1163.

In this case, individual members of the FOP have

diverse

interests which create internal conflicts such that the FOP cannot
represent all of its members.

The courts have consistently held

that this second prong of the association standing test cannot be
met when conflicts of interest exist within an association.

The

action then cannot be for the common good or benefit of all members
of the association.

For example, the United States Supreme Court

found that a women's association lacked standing with regard to
Medicaid

abortions because of a diversity of views within

membership of the association.
(1980).

Harris

v. McRae,

the

448 U.S. 297, 321

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied standing to a

contractors' association and stated:
Moreover, the claim asserted requires the
participation of the individual members of the
association. The association is clearly not
in a position to speak for its members . . . .
Their status and interests are too diverse and
the possibilities of conflict too obvious to
make the association an appropriate vehicle to
litigate the claims of its members
. . . .
Some stand to benefit from working on the
project under the agreement and still others
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will be heard by not being able to do so . . .
It is for the court, not the members of the
association,
to
determine
whether
their
interests require individual representation.
Here in view of the actual and potential
conflicts, they clearly do.

Associated

General

Contractors

v.

Otter

Tail

Power

Company,

611

F.2d 6 84, 691 (1979) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
An excellent discussion of the effects of conflicts within an
association

Practice

is

and

found

at

Procedure:

13 Wright, Miller

Jurisdiction

&

Federal

Cooper,

2d § 3531,9, at 617-623

(1984) (Exhibit 0 ) .
In this case, Appellant FOP is acting as a arepresentative for
its members, the West Valley

City

Police

Officers.

This

is

precisely the type of association that is subject to the test set

forth

in

Journalists

the

Utah

cases.

Restaurant

and

Society

of

Professional

The 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss brought

by

Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission attacked the standing of
the FOP, both on the face of the Complaint and factually.

The

trial court correctly found that, under either type of attack, the
FOP

failed

to

meet

the

minimum

requirements

for

association

standing.
When a complaint is attacked on its face, the court assumes
the facts as set forth in the complaint to be true.
First

Federal

Savings

and Loan,

549 F.2d, at 891.

advantage, the FOP failed to meet the test.

Mortensen

v.

Even given this

The original Complaint

and the Amended Complaints are devoid of any allegation regarding
individual members of the FOP having the capacity to bring this
action, nor do they describe specific damage to any FOP member.
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(R. 2-14, 73-77, 113-118)
action

can

be

Also, the FOP fails to allege that this

prosecuted

by

the

FOP

without

requiring

the

individual participation of its members. All of these elements are
necessary and their lack of pleading makes the FOP's Complaint
defective on its face, as was found by the trial court,

(R. 411-

412, 431-437)
The FOP's
basis.

standing was also attacked

on a purely

factual

When attacked in this manner, the FOP's Complaint is given

no deferential treatment.
determine

if

The Court may investigate the facts to

jurisdiction

exists,

and

the

Adams

jurisdiction is on the party asserting it.
F.2d, at 1219; Mortensen,

burden
v.

to
Bain,

prove
697

at 891, As was found by the trial court,

the facts support a finding that the FOP cannot meet the minimum
standing requirements of the association test.
The FOP clearly cannot meet the second prong of the test,
which

requires

that

the

action

not

require

participation of members of the association.

the

individual

Courts consistently

deny standing where there are conflicts of interest within the
association itself.

In this case, the trial court correctly found

that there were clear conflicts.

(R. 411-412, 431-437)

This case

falls squarely within the example provided by Justice Stewart, when
he stated that, " . . . individual participation may be required if
conflicts of interest exist between the members of an association."

Society

of

Professional

Journalists,

Dissent. )
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at

1182.

(J.

Stewart

The most dramatic example of this conflict lies on the very
face of the Complaint itself, where Nordfelt, a dues-paying FOP
member in good standing, was made a defendant (Exhibit K) .
002, 176, 186)
in

the

(R.

The FOP sued one of its own members and put itself

absurd

position

of

claiming

to

be

suing

in

its

representative capacity, when it has members as both plaintiffs and
defendants in the same case.
Also, the trial court found in finding of fact no. 14 (R. 433)
that the FOP was put in a position of deposing its own members as
hostile witnesses.
186,

189)

The

(R. 47-48, 50-51, 59-62, 92-93, 175-176, 178,

testing

process

which

is

being

formulated and administered by members of the FOP.
(Finding of fact No. 12, R. 433)

disputed

was

(R. 178, 189)

The allegations of

improper

actions during the testing process necessarily means that the FOP
is alleging that it was wronged by its own members who approved and
administered the test.

Those officers, Defendant Chief Nordfelt,

who approved the test, and Assistant Chief J. Steven Shreeve and
Lieutenant Larry L. Moody, who formulated and administered
Sergeant's test, were deposed by the FOP.
189)

the

(R. 59-60, 92-93, 178,

Even the FOP recognized the conflict by refusing to provide

Shreeve and Moody with legal counsel during the depositions

(R.

178, 189), and, in the case of Shreeve, specifically telling him
that it would not provide him with legal counsel at the deposition
due to a "conflict of interest."

(R. 189)

Both Shreeve and Moody

are dues-paying FOP members in good standing (Exhibits H and I ) .
(R. 178, 186, 189)
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Also,

if

Sergeant's

the

FOP

test and

is

successful

in

nullifying

the

1989

resulting promotions, the result would

be

dramatic, adverse consequences to certain individual members of the
FOP association,

FOP members Charles Illsley, Guy Dodge and Craig

Gibson were promoted to the rank of Sergeant as a result of the
1989 test.
the

The trial court found, in finding of fact no. 13, that

FOP members

will

lose rank, pay and

successfully nullifies the promotions.

benefits

the

FOP

All three individuals are

dues-paying members of the FOP (Exhibits L and M ) .
186)

if

(R. 181, 183,

Finally, the FOP has produced no evidence that would indicate

that, if it is not granted standing, the issues are not likely to
be raised at all or that the issues are so unique and important
than an exception should be made to the standing test.
contrary,

there

are

obviously

other

Plaintiffs

To the

(Crowley)

and

potential Plaintiffs (Salmon and Shopay) who are willing to take
action.
An association with internal conflicts of interest
cannot meet the standing test.

simply

The trial court correctly found

that the FOP failed the second prong of the association standing
test, since there are serious, obvious conflicts of interest within
the FOP and it cannot act for the benefit or common good of all of
its members.

The FOP lacks standing both on the face of the

Complaint itself and upon the facts of the case as found by the
trial court.
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POINT IV
APPELLANT CROWLEY SUFFERED NO INJURY, AND,
THEREFORE, DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING
THIS ACTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
In

order

to

carry

his

burden

of

proof

that

he

had

the

necessary standing to bring this action, Appellant Crowley had to
provide the court with evidence demonstrating that he has suffered
a distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute.
(Utah 1983); Wade v.

Burke,

Jenkins

v.

Swan,

675 P.2d 1145

800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990).

Also,

there must be a causal relationship between any injury to Crowley
and the actions of Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission.
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the standing test at length
in the Jenkins

case,

and stated:

. . . this Court will not readily rsalieve a
plaintiff of the salutory [sic] requirement of
showing a real and personal interest in the
dispute. . . . the inquiry will be directed to
the traditional criteria of the plaintiff's
personal stake in the controversy. One who is
adversely affected by governmental actions has
standing under this criterion. One who is not
adversely affected has no standing.
A mere
allegation of an adverse impact is not
sufficient.
There must also be some causal
relationship alleged between the injury to the
plaintiff, the governmental actions and the
relief requested.

Jenkins,

at 1150.

This test requires an injury particular to the plaintiff by
virtue of the claimed wrong, not a general injury.

Absent a claim

of specific injury related to the alleged illegal activity, this
standing test has not been met.

Jenkins,
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at 1151.

The 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss brought by Nordfelt and the
Civil Service Commission attacked Crowley's standing both on the
face of the Complaint and factually.

The Complaint and the Amended

Complaints are devoid of any allegations that Crowley received a
particularized injury, or that any injury was caused by the actions
of Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission.
113-118)

(R. 2-14, 73-77,

Therefore, the trial court correctly

found that the

Complaint, on its face, failed to establish Crowley's standing to
sue.

(R. 411-412, 431-437)
Crowley's standing was also attacked factually.

The facts, as

found by the trial court, support a finding that Crowley cannot
satisfy either factor required in Jenkins.
Sergeant's
minimum
testing.

promotional

score of

written

Crowley took the 1989

examination,

75 percent to advance

which

to the

required

next

a

level of

(R. 006, 186) As Crowley admits in his Second Affidavit,

he failed to reach the required score of 75 percent on the written
section of the examination, and, therefore, did not proceed further
in the testing
(R. 338)

and was not

He has not

listed on the promotional

alleged, nor

roster.

is it conceivable, how he

suffered a particularized injury in this case.

Even if the court

assumes that Crowley suffered an injury in failing the test, it is
clear that there is no causal relationship between any injury he
may have suffered and any alleged improper action by the Commission
or Nordfelt.

Crowley's failure on the written examination was

solely the result of his personal knowledge, ability and effort in
taking the examination.

Even if the actions complained of in the
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Complaint

were

true, none of

those actions

performance on the written test.

affected

Crowley's

The alleged improper actions by

Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission did not and could not
affect Crowley's test score one iota.
In his
standing.

brief, Crowley makes

two

arguments

assert

his

First, in the face of overwhelming evidence, including

his own Affidavit, he makes the allegation
minimum

to

passing

demonstrated

score

on

the

earlier on pages

written
24 and

that

there was

examination.

As

25 of this brief,

no
was

that

argument simply has no factual support.
Crowley's second argument is based upon the notion that he has
standing because he is a member of a class which has an interest in
the proper administration of the Civil Service Rules.
relies on a non-standing case, Hayward

v. Pennock,

He then

444 P. 2d 59

(Utah 1968), to advance the rationale that all officers have an
interest in proper administration of the Civil Service Rules.
fact, Hayward

In

recognizes, in the quote provided by Plaintiffs, that

this is an interest shared by both "employees and the public."
Hayward,

at 60.

This type of general interest or grievance cannot

form the basis for standing before the court.
An attempt to confer standing by merely having

a general

interest common to the public or a class of individuals is exactly
the type of case that the "distinct and palpable injury" test is
designed to screen out.

The United States Supreme Court has held

that:
Petitioners must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury
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has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class to which they belong and
which they purport to represent. Unless these
petitioners can thus demonstrate the requisite
case
or
controversy
between
themselves
personally and respondents, "none may seek
relief on behalf of himself or any other
member of the class."
Warth,

at 502 (emphasis added).
The Warth

court also stated that:

the Court has held that when the
asserted harm is a "generalized grievance"
shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
normally
does
not warrant
exercise
of
jurisdiction.

Warth,

In Schlesinger

at 499.

v. Reservists

to Stop

the War, 418

U.S. 208, 41 L.Ed.2d 706, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974), the Supreme Court
expressed its reluctance to entertain "generalized grievances about
the conduct of Government," and also, in defining the type of
injury

required

to

establish

standing,

"Abstract injury is not enough."

stated

Schlesinger,

flatly

that,

418 U.S., at 220.

The Utah Supreme Court also rejected the generalized grievance
argument

and held

that

it is generally

insufficient
Jenkins,

plaintiff to assert a general interest.

for the

at 1149.

The

Court has also stated that, ". . . this Court will not lightly
dispense with the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake
in the outcome of a specific dispute."
State

Lands,

716

P.2d

796

(Utah

Terracor
1986).

v.

Utah

Also,

Board

of

conclusory

allegations which are not supported by specific facts which show
injury

do not meet

Washington

County

the standing

Elected

Officials,
39

test.

York

v.

Unqualified

714 P.2d 679 (Utah 1986).

Finally, Crowley has produced no evidence that would indicate
that if he is not granted standing, then these issues will not be
raised or that the issues are so unique and important than an
exception to the standing test should be made.
are other Plaintiffs

Obviously, there

(FOP) and potential Plaintiffs

Shopay) who are willing to tak€> action,

(Salmon and

Crowley's contention that

he meets the exception criteria of the Jenkins

case is not well

founded or supported.
Crowley failed to carry his burden of providing the trial
court with facts which form a basis for his standing before the
court.

Furthermore, such facts simply do not exist.

The trial

court correctly found that both on the face of the Complaint and
upon the facts, as investigated and found by the trial court,
Crowley did not have standing to bring this action.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT STANDING TEST.
The Complaint filed by the FOP and Crowley is clearly in the
nature of the now abolished writ of mandamus.

It asked the court

to order a lower board, the Civil Service Commission, and a public
officer, the Police Chief, to take certain actions.

Rule 65B of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) (Exhibit D) provides that
there shall be no special forms of writ such as writs of

mandamus.

Rule 65B provides a remedy to replace the writ of mandamus,
specifies that it shall be commenced by complaint.
traditionally

treated

appeals

from

decisions

commissions as being governed by Rule 65B.
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of

and

Courts have
civil

service

For example, Lee

v.

Provo

City

Child

v.

Civil

Salt

(Utah 1978).

Service

Commission,

Lake City

Civil

582 P. 2d 485 (Utah 1978);

Service

Commission, 575 P. 2d 195

The trial court correctly applied the extraordinary

writ standing test as an alternative standing test, and determined
that

the FOP and Crowley could not meet the minimum

standing

requirements.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has determined

that

the

standing

requirements necessary to obtain review of a lower board decision
under Rule 65B are the following:
1.

The plaintiff has standing before the lower body.

2.

A ruling by the lower body was adverse to the plaintiff.

3.

The plaintiff presented the claim to the lower body.

The court stated that if a plaintiff fails to establish any one of
those requirements, the Rule 65B claim will not be considered.

Society

of Professional

Journalists,

at 1172.

Based upon the findings and conclusions discussed earlier in
this brief, Appellant FOP cannot meet the first two prongs of this
test.

If the FOP has no standing to appear before the trial court

as a plaintiff, it follows that it would have not standing to
appear before the Appellee Civil Service Commission.
ruling of the Commission was not adverse to the FOP.

Also, the

Some members

of the FOP association, those promoted or high on the roster, were
not adversely affected by rulings of the Commission.

However, it

is the third prong of the test which the FOP obviously cannot meet.
The trial court correctly found that the FOP had not presented its
claim to the Commission.

(Finding of fact no. 11; R. 433)
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The

only evidence presented to the trial court on this issue supported
that finding.

Also, the Supreme Court has denied standing to a

party on an appeal because the party failed to take action at the
administrative level.
Appellant
Professional

S & G v. Morgan,

Crowley

Journalists'

also

fails

191 P. 2d 1086 (Utah 1990).
to

meet

the

Society

of

Rule 65B test. Crowley does not meet the

first or second prongs of the test.

Based upon the same rationale

set forth above regarding his individual jurisdiction before this
Court,

Crowley

Commission.

also

lacks

standing

to

proceed

before

the

He simply did not suffer a particularized injury as a

result of the Commission's or Police Chief's actions. Also, as set
forth above, the rulings of the Commission were
Crowley.

not adverse to

Neither the Commission nor the Chief in any way affected

Crowley's performance on the written examination.
POINT VI
APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALMON
AND SHOPAY'S MOTION FOR JOINDER IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT# AND SAID MOTION
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
This Court cannot consider the trial court's denial of William
Salmon and David Shopay's Motion for Joinder, since Salmon and
Shopay are not parties to this appeal.

Standing to prosecute an

appeal must be based upon an interest in the trial court's decision
which is "direct, immediate and substantial."
P. 2d 668, 670 (Okla. App. 1985).

Creamer

v. Bucyr

700

The only parties below which

chose to file an appeal were the FOP and Crowley (R. 439-440), and
they have no standing to assert the rights of other parties who
choose not to file an appeal.
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It is clear that an appellant cannot prosecute an appeal on an
Utility

issue which is not adverse to the appellant.

Association

of New Jersey,

Inc.

1974); International

Brother

Helpers

Local

of America,

Keystone

Freight

Lines,

v. Toops,

507 F.2d 83, 86 (3rd Cir.

of Teamsters,
Union No.

Inc.,

Contractors

Chaffeurs,

523,

of

Stablemen

Tulsa,

and

Oklahoma,

v.

123 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1941).

As

the Supreme Court has stated, "Only parties to a decree can appeal.
If a party to the suit is in no manner affected by what is decreed,
he cannot be said to be a party to the decree."
Trust

Co.,

106 U.S. 265, 269 (1982).

Farmers'

Loan

and

Whether or not Salmon and

Shopay are joined as parties in this case has absolutely no affect
upon the Court's decision as to whether or not the FOP and Crowley
have standing.

There are few cases upon this procedural issue and

no Utah cases, but the rationale is clear.
stated

in the

Utility

Contractors

case,

As the Third Circuit
"This

small point

of

appellate procedure has not often been litigated, probably because
it is so elementary."
Assuming arguendo,

Utility

Contractors,

at 85.

that the court determines it is proper to

rule upon the propriety of the trial court's denial of Salmon and
Shopay's Motion for Joinder, it is clear that the trial court's
decision was correct.

First, the cases establish that standing is

an issue which directly affects the subject matter jurisdiction of
a court to hear a lawsuit.
Systems

International,

Heath

Techna

Corporation

588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978).

v.

Sound

If the trial

court finds that the original plaintiff does not have standing,
then dismissal of the case is the only action available to the
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court.

Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly

mandates

that whenever

it appears that a court does not

have

subject matter jurisdiction, then, " . . . the court shall dismiss
the action."

(Exhibit C.)

(Emphasis added.)

Also, the cases are

clear that when a court lacks subject matter
authority
Deschenes

extends
v. King

Drilling

Company,

no

further

County,
Inc.

than

to

jurisdiction, its

dismiss

the

Mlnter-Wilson

521 P. 2d 1181 (Wash. 1974);
v.

Randall,

action.

675 P. 2d 365 (Kan, 1984).

Perhaps the most concise statement regarding this area of law
was made by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Matter
Order

(Anderson),

of

Contempt

765 P. 2d 933 (Wyo. 1988), when the court stated:

It is fundamental, if not axiomatic, that,
before a court can render any decision or
order having any effect in any case or matter,
it must have subject matter jurisdiction.
(Citation omitted.) Jurisdiction is essential
to the exercise of judicial power. (Citation
omitted.) Once the court has jurisdiction, it
lacks any authority to proceed, and any
decision, judgment or other order is, as a
matter of law, utterly void and of no effect
for any purpose.
Matter

of

Contempt

Order

(Anderson),

at 936.

These cases are

consistent with Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(Exhibit C ) .
When the trial court determined that the FOP and Crowley did
not have standing, then the court had no jurisdiction to grant the
Motion for Joinder of potential plaintiffs, Salmon and Shopay.
Salmon and Shopay were always free to file their own action against
the Defendants; however, they cannot join a nonexisting lawsuit and
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thereby

bootstrap

the

action

into

a

position

of

potential

jurisdiction.
It was within the discretion of the trial court and based upon
sound legal principles that the Motion for Joinder was denied.
CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

advanced

above,

the

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order of the trial court should be
affirmed in all respects.

DATED this

2<*T

day of

J>ZPT£MBI/£

<a
L

, 1992.

J.f Richard Catten
AtWrney for Defendants/Appellees
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day of
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Appellees upon Jerrald D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie, counsel for
the Appellants in this matter, by mailing the Briefs to them by
first class mail, with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following
address:
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq,
Peter L. Rognlie, Esq.
Conder & Wangsgard
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Exhibit A:

Tr-; = i r>

Trial Court Ruling

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

COURT'S RULING

WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4, a
nonprofit corporation, and
JIM CROWLEY,

CIVIL NO.

890907667

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, and
WEST VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Defendants.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
that

the

plaintiffs,

who

have

the

The Court finds

burden

of

establishing

standing, have not established standing to bring this lawsuit.
The facts set forth in the Complaint fail to establish that
the

plaintiff,

Jim

Crowley,

has

personally

suffered

some

distinct, particularized and palpable injury that is related to
defendants'

conduct.

The

Court

further

finds

that

the

individual members of the Fraternal Order of Police must have
standing, and FOP likewise lacks standing.

There is no showing

that the members of FOP have particularized

specific

injuries

00411

RULING

PAGE TWO

WEST VALLEY F.O.P. V. NORDFELT

that were presented in a claim to the lower body.

Further, it

appears

within

clear,

association

that

and

conflicts

its

members.

of

interest

The

exist

standard

for

the

examining

standing, set forth in Society of Professional Journalists v.
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166

(Utah 1987), and Utah Restaurant Assoc,

v. Davis Co, Bd. of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Utah 1985), makes it
clear that these plaintiffs have no standing on the face of the
Complaint and on a closer examination of the facts of the case.
Defendants'

Motion

to

Strike

plaintiffs'

supplemental

memorandum is denied.
The Complaint in this matter is dismissed.

The motion for

joinder is denied,
Mr.

Catten to prepare detailed

Findings and an Order

for

the Court's signature.
Dated this

/v

-^ day of November, 1 9 9 1 * ^

'—-

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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RULING

PAGE THREE

WEST VALLEY F.O.P. V, NORDFELT

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

this /O

foregoing

Court's

Ruling,

to

the

following,

day of November, 1991:

J. D. Conder
K. C. Bennett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
J. Richard Catten
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
3 600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 84119

k~ It

K.
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Exhibit B:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Decision and Order

2 h 1992

£^£QA£&Ad^
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
The

Court,

upon

review

of

the

pleadings,

memoranda,

affidavits, authorities and arguments of the parties, and being
fully

advised

in

the

premises, hereby makes

and

enters

the

following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order
with respect to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Joinder.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 20, 1989, West Valley City conducted a

promotional examination for the position of Sergeant in the West
Valley City Police Department.
2.

One year of service with the West Valley City Police

Department was required in order to be eligible for promotion to
Sergeant.
3.

The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required that

applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within the West Valley
City Police Department.
4.
and

Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades (POI, POII

POIII)

were

eligible

for

promotion

to

Sergeant

with

no

preference being given to the members of any one grade.
5.
and

On or about March 28, 1991, FOP members William Salmon

David

Shopay

filed

a

Motion

for

Joinder

as

additional

Plaintiffs in this action.
6.

Plaintiff

Jim

Crowley

participated

in

the

written

examination portion of the Sergeant promotional process.
7.

Plaintiff

Jim

Crowley

did

not

receive

the

minimum

required passing score on the written examination and, therefore,
did not proceed further in the promotional process.
8.

Plaintiff

particularized

and

Jim

Crowley

palpable

did

injury

not

related

suffer
to

the

a

distinct,
conduct

of

(FOP) is

an

Defendants.
9.

The

Fraternal

Order of

Police

Lodge

#4

association consisting of a majority of the officers of the West
2
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Valley

City

Police

Department,

including

both

officers

who

participated in the Sergeant promotional process and officers who
did not.
10.

Members

particularized

of

and

the

palpable

FOP
injury

did

not

related

suffer
to

the

distinct,
conduct

of

Defendants.
11.

Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the Civil

Service Commission prior to commencement of this lawsuit.
12.

Members

of the FOP were

involved

in

formulating

and

conducting the Sergeant promotional process.
13.

Members of the FOP would lose their promotion to Sergeant

should Plaintiff FOP's action be successful.
14.

Members of the FOP were deposed as adverse witnesses by

Plaintiffs.
15.

Defendant Dennis Nordfelt was a member of the FOP at the

time the action was filed and until October, 1991.
16.

On or about August

argued before the Court.

23, 1991, this matter was

orally

Subsequent to that argument, Plaintiffs

submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants thereupon filed a Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters the following Conclusions of Law:
1.

Plaintiffs appearing before the Court must have standing

in order to bring a lawsuit.
3
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2.

The

burden

of

establishing

standing

is

upon

the

plaintiffs.
3.

To establish standing, individual plaintiffs must show

that they have personally suffered some distinct, particularized
and palpable injury that is related to the defendant's conduct.
4.

To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show

that individual members of the association have suffered distinct,
particularized

and palpable injuries related to the defendant's

conduct, thereby showing that individual members of the association
have s tanding.
5.

To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show

that the action does not require individual participation of the
members of the association.
of

interest

exist

within

This standard is not met if conflicts
and

between

the association

and

its

members.
6.

To establish standing, plaintiffs who challenge or seek

review of the actions or orders of a lower commission must show
that:
a)

the plaintiff had standing before the appropriate
lower body;

b)

the

plaintiff

presented

the

claim

to

the

lower

body;
c)

a ruling

by

the

lower body was

adverse

to

the

plaintiff.
1.

Plaintiff Crowley has failed, both on the face of the

complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet his burden to
4
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establish that he suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable
injury related to the conduct of Defendants, and therefore does not
have standing in this case.
8.

Plaintiff

FOP

has

failed,

both

on

the

face

of

the

complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to
establish that individual members of the FOP suffered distinct,
particularized

and palpable injuries related to the conduct of

Defendants, and therefore does not have standing in this case,
9.

Plaintiff

FOP

has

failed,

both

on

the

face

of

the

complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to
establish that the FOP presented its claims to the Civil Service
Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this case,
10.

Plaintiff

FOP

has

conflicts

within

and

between

the

association and its members that preclude the association from
representing its members and requires the individual participation
of the members of the association, and therefore does not have
standing in this case.
11.

Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

12.

The

Court's

determination

that

Plaintiff

FOP

and

Plaintiff Crowley do not have standing and the subsequent dismissal
of their complaint renders William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion
for Joinder moot.
13.

It

is within

the discretion

of

the Court

to

accept

supplemental memoranda and affidavits provided by the parties.

5
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DECISION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,

it

is the

decision

of

the

Court

that

Plaintiff

FOP

and

Plaintiff Jim Crowley have not established standing necessary to
bring

this

lawsuit-

Based

upon

the

facts

set

forth

in

the

complaint, and upon a close examination of the facts of the case,
the Court

finds

that Plaintiff

Jim Crowley has

not

personally

suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable injury related to
Defendants' conduct which would provide him with standing in this
case.

The

established
distinct,

Court
that

further

finds

individual

particularized

Defendants' conduct.

that

members

and

of

palpable

Plaintiff
the

FOP

FOP
have

injuries

has

not

suffered

related

to

The Court further finds that clear conflicts

of interest exist within and between the FOP association and its
members, which prevent it from meeting the established criteria for
standing of an association.

In addition, the Court finds that the

FOP has failed to present its claims to the appropriate lower body,
the Civil Service Commission.
It

is

the

decision

Supplemental Memorandum

of

the

Court

to

accept

Plaintiffs'

in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

to

Dismiss.
It is the Decision of the Court to deny the Motion for Joinder
since the Court has determined that Plaintiffs lack standing and
the Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the action.

-6-
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decision:
NOW

THEREFORE,

IT

IS

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and that the complaint in this matter
is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion
for Joinder is denied.
MADE and ENTERED this

of " ^ V ^ M ^ . i!

uP&kj^f Leslie A. Lewis
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Exhibit C:

Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

Rule 12 Defenses and objections.
(a) When p r e s e n t e d A defendant ^hall ^eive his answer within twent\
dav s after tb< ^ i \ ice of the summon and complaint 1^ complete unless other
w ise e\pi< s 1\ pro\ ided b\ statute 01 JI d( » of the eoui t A p n t\ -ei ved w ith a
pleading S i t i n g a eioss claim agairw 1 im shall serve an MISWCI thereto
within twentv davs after the service upon h m I he plaintiff ^hall ser\e hi^
replv to a counter claim m the answer w ithin twenty da\ s aft( i sei vice of the
answer or i f a r e p l > is ordered bv, tire court w ithin twenty da\ s after service
of the 01 dei unless the order other w i^e dir ects The ser \ ice of a motion under
this i ule alter s these per lods of time as follows unless a differ cnt time is fixed
by order of the court
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the r e s p o n s e pleading shall be served within ten
da>s after notice of the courts action
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the
responsive pleading shall be seived within ten days after the service of
the moie definite statement
(b) Hov\ p r e s e n t e d Every defense in law oi fact to claim for relief in an)
pleading whether a claim c o u n t e u l u m cross claim oi third oartv claim
h ill b( i^iMcd ri the ie^pon^ivc pK di
tK r c to if one i^ c in d ( \cept
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader oe made by
motion (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failuie to join an indispensable party A motion m a k i n g any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to t h a t claim for
relief If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, m a t t e r s
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56
(c) Motion for judgment on the p l e a d i n g s . After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, m a t t e r s
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial
(e) Motion for m o r e definite s t a t e m e n t . If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a part> cannot
leasonabl} be required to frame a responsive pleading, he ma\ move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just

(f) Motion to s t r i k e . Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous m a t t e r .
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and t h e n available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of d e f e n s e s . A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise t h a t the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) P l e a d i n g after d e n i a l of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for c o s t s of a n o n r e s i d e n t plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file u n d e r t a k i n g . If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "and complaint" in the first sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — Except for minor variations, this rule follows Rule 12, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Motions generally,
Rule 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
—Criteria.
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Explained.
—Improper.
—Standard of review.
Presentation of defenses.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
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Divorce.
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.
General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
Venue.
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
—Failure to file.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
—Court's discretion.
—Court's initiative.
—Defenses.
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
—Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.

Exhibit D:

Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure

IVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 65B

(4) in all other cases where an
would be proper in equity.

injunction

Rule 65B. E x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t s .
(a) Special forms of w r i t s a b o l i s h e d . Special
forms of pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus,
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are
hereby abolished. Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of
the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (b) and (f) of this
rule.
(b) G r o u n d s for relief. Appropriate relief may be
granted:
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil
or military, or a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of this state; or
any public officer, civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the provisions of
law works a forfeiture of his office; or a n association of persons act as a corporation within this
state without being legally incorporated; or any
corporation has offended against any provision of
the law, as it may have been amended, by or
under which law such corporation was created,
altered or renewed; or any corporation h a s forfeited its privileges and franchises by nonuser or
has committed an act amounting to a surrender
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges
and franchises or has misused a franchise or
privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or
person to perform an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from a n office, t r u s t or
station; or to compel the admission of a p a r t y to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal or by
such corporation, board or person; or
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest t h e proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, when such proceedings are without
or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board or person.
(c) Action b y a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l u n d e r S u b d i v i sion (b)(1) of this r u l e . The attorney general may,
and when directed so to do by the governor shall,
commence any action authorized by the provisions of
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. Such action shall be
brought in the name of the state of Utah.
(d) Action by p r i v a t e p e r s o n u n d e r S u b d i v i sion (b)(1) of this r u l e . A person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully held and
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A
private person may bring an action upon any other
ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, only
if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any
such action commenced by a private person shall be
brought in his own name. Upon filing the complaint,
such person shall also file an undertaking with sufficient sureties, in the same form required of bonds on
appeal under the provision of Rule 73 and conditioned
that such person will pay any judgment for costs or
damages recovered against him in such action.

xvuie our>

u i n n nujLH/O u r

(e) N a t u r e a n d e x t e n t of relief u n d e r Subdivision (b)(2) of this r u l e . Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the
adverse party before issuance of the writ, or may
grant an order to show cause why such writ should
not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If
the writ is granted, it shall be directed to the inferior
tribunal, board, or officer, or to any other person having t h e custody of the record or proceedings, commanding such tribunal, board or officer to certify
fully to the court issuing the writ, within a specified
time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, describing or referring to them with sufficient certainty; and if a stay of proceedings is intended, requiring the party in the meantime to desist from further proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The
review by the court issuing the writ shall not be extended further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued
the authority of such tribunal, board or officer.
(f) H a b e a s corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas
corpus proceedings shall be granted whenever it appears to t h e proper court that any person is unjustly
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If
the person seeking relief is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United
States or under t h e Constitution of the state of Utah,
or both, then t h e person seeking such relief shall proceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). In all other
cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall be
conducted in accordance with the following provisions:
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among
other things, state that the person designated is
illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant and t h e place where he is so restrained, if
known (stating wherein and the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information
of the plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment or restraint has not already been adjudged
upon a prior proceeding; whether another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief
thereunder denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such complaint and stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory
reasons for the failure to do so.
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court
most convenient to the plaintiff.
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court
shall, unless it appears from such complaint or
the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time
and place therein specified, at which time the
court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear
the matter and render judgment accordingly. If
the writ is not issued the court shall state its
reasons therefor in writing and file the same
with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy
thereof to the plaintiff.
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he
does not have such person in custody, the writ
(and any other process issued) may be served
upon any one having such person in custody, in
the manner and with the same effect as if he had
been made defendant in the action.
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(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the person a t t e m p t i n g to
serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to
carry the person imprisoned or restrained out of
the county or state after service of t h e writ, the
person serving t h e writ shall immediately arrest
the defendant, or other person so resisting, and
bring him, together with the person designated
in the writ, forthwith before the court before
which t h e writ is made returnable.
(6) At the time of the issuance of t h e writ, the
court may, if it appears t h a t t h e person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before
compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause a
w a r r a n t to issue, reciting t h e facts, and directing
the sheriff to take such person and forthwith
bring him before the court to be dealt with according to law.
(7) The defendant shall appear a t t h e proper
time and place with the person designated or
show good cause for not doing so and m u s t answer the complaint within t h e time allowed. The
answer must state plainly and unequivocally
whether he then h a s , or at any time h a s had, the
person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, t h e cause thereof. If such person h a s been transferred, t h e defendant must
state that fact, and to whom, when t h e transfer
was made, and t h e reason or authority therefor.
The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of
form or misdescription of the person restrained or
defendant, if enough is stated to show t h e meaning and intent thereof.
(8) The person restrained m a y waive his right
to be present at the hearing, in which case the
writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a determination of t h e m a t t e r t h e court m a y place
such person in the custody of such individual or
individuals as may be deemed proper.
(g) When counsel a p p o i n t e d for petitioner. Any
person filing a petition for habeas corpus m a y be appointed counsel whenever t h e district court, upon examination of the petition, determines t h a t t h e petition is not frivolous and t h a t such person is financially unable to obtain representation. If t h e petition
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall,
without further action, dismiss t h e petition
(h) When w r i t r e t u r n a b l e . Any alternative writ
issued by a court or a judge thereof, may be made
returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at any
time as such court may in its discretion determine.
(i) P o s t c o n v i c t i o n h e a r i n g s .
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
or county jail under a commitment of any court,
whether such imprisonment be under an original
commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or parole, who asserts that in
any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights
under the Constitution of t h e United States or of
the state of Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding under this rule.
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing
a complaint, together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the court in which such relief lS
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy
of the complaint so filed upon the attorney ge n "
eral of the state of Utah if imprisoned in t h e state
prison, or the county attorney of the county
where imprisoned if in a county jail Such service
may be made by a n \ of the methods provided fcr
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service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing such copy to the attorney
general or county attorney by United States
mail, postage prepaid, and by filing with the
clerk of said court a certificate of mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the
attorney general or county attorney. Upon the
filing of such a complaint, the clerk shall
promptly bring the same to the attention of the
presiding judge of the court in which such complaint is filed.
(2) The complaint shall state that the person
seeking relief is illegally restrained of his liberty
by the defendant; shall state the place where he
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings in which the complainant
was convicted and by which he was subsequently
confined and of which he now complains; and
shall set forth in plain and concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were violated. The complaint shall
have attached thereto affidavits, copies of
records, or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why the same are not attached.
The complaint shall also state whether or not
the judgment of conviction that resulted in the
confinement complained of has been reviewed on
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate
proceedings and state the results thereof.
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality of his commitment or
confinement has not already been adjudged in a
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding;
and if the complainant shall have instituted prior
similar proceedings in any court, state or federal,
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his
complaint, shall attach a copy of any pleading
filed in such court by him to his complaint, and
shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief
in such other court. In such case, if it is apparent
to the court in which the proceeding under this
rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confinement has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written
notice thereof by mail to the complainant, and no
further proceedings shall be had on such complaint.
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set forth in the complaint,
but may be set out in a separate supporting memorandum or brief if the complainant so desires.
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional rights shall be raised in the
postconviction proceeding brought under this
rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good cause shown
therein.
(5) [Deleted.]
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of
the complaint upon him, the attorney general, or
the county attorney, as the case may be, shall
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto.
Any further pleadings or amendments shall be in
conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall
immediately set the case for a hearing within
twenty days thereafter unless the court in its discretion determines that further time is needed

Rule 66

Prior to the hearing, the state or county shall
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court
records as may be relevant and material to the
case. The court, on its own motion, or upon the
request of either party, may order a prehearing
conference if good reason exists therefor; but
such conference shall not be set so as to unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the
complaint. The complainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or conference.
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the interest of convenience and
economy, the hearing should be transferred to
the district court having jurisdiction over the
place of confinement of complainant, the court
may enter a written order transferring such case
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so
doing.
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining
the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and
the same shall be made a part of the record in the
case.
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it
shall enter an appropriate order with respect to
the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such further orders with respect to
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge
as the court may deem just and proper in the
case.
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the
costs of the proceedings, he may proceed in forma
pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that
effect, in which event the court may direct the
costs to be paid by the county in which he was
originally charged.
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by
the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil
cases.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; March 1, 1988.)

Exhibit E:

West Valley City Civil Service
Policy and Procedures Manual:
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

11-32
III-l
III-2
III-6
III-7

-Tr-3^

Lay-Off

lAsts.

Any employee l^ci off because of force reductions, abolition of
position, or other reasofis^TOt the fault of the enployee, may be restored to
the top of the applicable eliglblej.ist.
11-31.

Probationary Period,

The probationary or working test period shall be regarded as an integral
part of the examination process and shall be utilized for training and for
closely observing the enployee's work and ability, securing the most effective
adjustmsnt of a new or promoted enployee, and for rejecting any enployee whose
performance does not meet the required work standards.
11-32.

Duration.

(1) All sworn police officers and firefighters certified and appointed
or promoted to a Civil Service position shall be required to successfully complete a work and training test during a probationary
period of one year to enable the appointing power to observe the
enployee's ability to perform the various duties pertaining to the
position,
(2) All Civil Service employees shall serve a one-year probation,. The
woxk and training test shall begin irrmediately upon appointment and
shall continue for a period of time appropriate to the duties of the
position involved.
(3)

11-33.

If the department requests an extension of the established probationary period before the expiration thereof , the Commission may
approve the extension of the probationary period or may take such
action on its own initiative.
Dismissal.

At any time during the probationary period, the Chief, after consultation
with the Personnel Officer and City Attorney's Office, may remove a
probationary enployee from employment without cause or ray return a prior
Civil Service enployee to a previous position without cause. Removal of such
enployee shall be effective upon written notification from the Chief, and is
not subject to appeal.
11-34.

Ijeave During Probationary PasriLod.

Time spent on any leave of absence without pay shall not be considered
as part of any probationary period.
11-35.

Probationary Period Reports.

At least ten (10) days prior to the expiration of an employee's
probationary period, the Chief shall notify the Personnel Department and the
Comuission in writing whether the services of the enployee have been
-13-
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11-44.

Q m n g e of Address.

All Civil Service employees, probationary or otherwise, must advise the
Personnel Officer of any change of residence or address within ten days
following such changes.

III.
PROMOTIONS
-£11-1*

Basis and Classification.

The Commission shall provide for promotion in the Civil Service on the
basis of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing obtained by
competitive examination, and shall provide, in all cases where practicable,
that vacancies shall be filled by promotion from the members of the next lower
rank as submit themselves for the examination and promotion. The Commission
shall certify to the Chief from an eligibles list the names of not more than
5 applicants having the highest rating for each promotion.
III-2.

Types of Pramotians,

Promotions shall be designated as promotions in grade or promotions in
rank. Promotions in grade shall be those promotions made in recognition of
superior skills in the performance of duties achieved through experience and
proficiency, but which do not involve a substantial change in duties.
Promotions in rank shall be those promotions which result in a substantial
change in assigned duties, requiring supervisory and administrative skills or
substantially different training skills.
III-2*

Physical Examination Requirements far All Pranacitians.

All applicants for promotion must have passed a physical examination
prescribed by the Commission within one year prior to the date such promotion
is made. Such physical examination shall determine that the applicant has no
non-correctable physical disorders or handicaps which wsuld disqualify the
applicant for the position sought, or which would interfere with the
applicant's maximum performance in the position being sought.
If it is
determined that the applicant has some correctable physical disorder or
handicap which disqualifies the applicant from promotion or would prevent the
applicant from giving the maximum performance in the position being sought,
the commission may refuse to certify such applicant as being eligible for
promotion until such disorder or handicap is corrected or the Commission may
waive the requirement.
III-3.

Failure on Hiysical or Mental Examinations far Promotion.

Whenever a Civil Service employee fails to pass a physical or mental
examination by a physician, the examining physician shall make a report to the
Commission setting forth the following infonration:
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III-5.
A-

Relative Weights of Various Hhases.

lasting weight is not to exceed 60% for any of the following categories:
(1)

Performance Ratings;
The performance ratings (merit) of the
respective departments dealing with leadership and administrative
abilities for the immediate past years required for promotion
candidacy.

(2)

Written Examination.

(3)

Oral Assessment:
Applicants may be involved with an assessment
board to determine their self-confidence, bearing, personality
traits, leadership qualities, supervisory abilities, determination
of intelligence, aptitudes and abilities in dealing with problem
situations.

(4)

Promotability: An assessment of the candidate's ability to perform
in the desired position by a board of higher-ranking officers.

Weights shall be approved prior to examination by Civil Service.
lii-te.

Jb^ramotions in Grade.

Promotions in grade are designed to provide persons in Civil Service with
the opportunity to obtain progressive salary increases based upon a
combination of longevity in service, physical fitness, and proficiency in
perfornance of duties as ascertained by the Commission from the periodic merit
ratings, written and oral examinations, and other required data. All in-grade
advancements are to be handled in a uniform nanner. M l merit pay increases
shall be handled in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the West
Valley City Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual.
Whenever a member of the Civil Service shall have the necessary requirements for a promotion in grade and shall have passed such examination as
provided in these rules, or as prescribed by the CCmmission, if any, the
Personnel Officer shall certify to the Chief that such person is eligible for
promotion in grade.
Upon certification, the Chief nay, at any time
thereafter, promote such persai to the grade for which he is certified. The
City Manager nay approve or disapprove any merit increase or in-grade
promotion for good cause.
Whenever the Chief, with the City Manager's
approval, shall nake the promotion in grade, notice of the action and the date
on which such promotion is effective is to be given to the Camiission.
III-7.

Prnmrrtions in Rank.

Promotions in rank shall be those promotions which result in a substantial change in assigned duties, requiring supervisory and administrative
skills or substantially different training skills.
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Exhibit F:

West Valley Police Department
Manual, Section 1700.23

Kegs, 1/00.21 Cont'

Chapter 6
(2/87)

Rank is a designation of a specific level of responsibility for execution of work, supervision, command,
management, or administration specifically distinguished from other levels by class specifications and
name.
1700.22

Rank Order
Rank order is the vertical relationship of the several
ranks of this department in respect to levels of
authority and responsibility.

E700. 23f

Rank Structure;
Rank structure is the hierarchial arrangement of ranks
within the department. The ranks of this department
are listed below in descending order:
Police Chief
Lieutenant
Sergeant
Police Officer

1700.24

Services Line
Line services are functions and activities which are
basically concerned with fulfilling primary police
responsibilities.

1700.25

Services, Staff

Staff services are non-line functions and a c t i v i t i e s
which serve the purposes of developing personnel into
e f f e c t i v e p a t r o l o f f i c e r s , s u p e r v i s o r s , commanding
o f f i c e r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and of developing t h i s
department to most effectively meet i t s responsibili t i e s in f u l f i l l i n g the police purposes or missions.
1700.26

Watch
A watch designates one of the three basic time units
for assignment of personnel, usually specified in
terms of eight or ten hour periods.
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Exhibit G:

Affidavits of Cory Ervin (2)
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PAUL T. MORRIS, #37 38
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801)966-3600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF CORY ERVIN

Plaintiffs,
vs,
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, CORY ERVIN, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as
follows:
1.

I have worked for West Valley City since September, 1984.
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2.

My current position with West Valley City is Personnel

Generalist in the Administration Department.
3.

Since January, 1986, I have served as Secretary to the

West Valley City Civil Service Commission,

The duties of that

position include being the custodian of all records of the West
Valley City Civil Service Commission.
4.

The Civil Service Commission records in my possession

indicate the following:
a.

The written examination for promotion to sergeant
in the West Valley City Police Department was given
on Thursday, July 20, 1989.

b.

The minimum passing score on the written examination
was a score of 75.

c.

Officer Jim Crowley applied and took the written
examination.

d.

Officer Crowley did not receive a score of 75 or
above the written examination, and therefore, did
not advance to the assessment center portion of the
testing.

e.

Officer Crowley, because of his below passing score
on

the

written

test,

is

not

listed

on

the

promotional roster which resulted from the 1989
sergeants' examination.
5.

As

custodian

of

the

records

and

Secretary

to the

Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge, of the
Commission receiving any request, appeal, or other communication
2
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from the organization known as "West Valley City Fraternal Order of
Police Lodge #4" regarding the 1989 sergeants' examination, except
in connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit.
6•

As

custodian

of

the

records

and - Secretary

to

the

Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge of the
Commission sending any information, ruling, or other communication
regarding the 1989 sergeants' examination, except information
supplied in connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit.
7.

The records of the Civil Service Commission also reflect

that Charles Illsley and Guy Dodge were promoted to sergeant as a
result of the 1989 sergeants' examination.

Also, Craig Gibson is

currently listed as Number One on the sergeants' promotional
roster.
8.

As Personnel Generalist for West Valley City, one of my

job duties is to track employee payroll deductions and to enter and
delete such deductions from the payroll system.
9.

As of the payroll period ending February 8, 1991, Dennis

Nordfelt, Guy

Dodge, Charles

Illsley, Craig

Gibson, Stephen

Shreeve, and Larry Moody have all authorized and are paying dues to
the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4 by payroll
deduction.
DATED this

\C\

day of February, 1991.

t

AY[AA

£ui
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>

CORYEHVIN

U018Q

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991.

/9 <**-

day of

^yC^t^c^t^- ~7°- '7&sMs4>&^£^(-4--~
NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing at: ~^6*i-

~?LA^L£^

CJ-U^V6<_^^

My Commission Expires:

Q^*^<

A9

/99V-

KAREN P HINCKLEY
Notary Public
STATE OF UTAH
My Commission Expires
June 29,1994
3600 Consttrtor,. Watf Vrfty Oy 'JT M119
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PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801)966-3600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF CORY ERVIN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

I, CORY ERVIN, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as
follows:
1.

I have worked for West Valley City since September, 1984.

2.

My current position with West Valley City is Personnel

Generalist in the Administration Department.
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3.

Since January, 1986, I have served as Secretary to the

West Valley City Civil Service Commission.

The duties of that

position include being the custodian of all Commission records,
preparing minutes of all Commission meetings and providing the
necessary clerical support to Commission members,
4.

As

Personnel

Generalist,

my

duties

include

the

coordination and administration of promotional examinations and
entry level examinations for City employees.
5.

As

Civil

Service

Secretary,

I have

been

present

on

numerous occasions when the Civil Service Commission discussed and
approved testing criteria for various promotional tests, including
the 1989 Sergeants' Promotional Examination•
6•

It has been my experience and personal observation as

Civil Service Secretary that prior to each promotional examination
the Civil Service Commission approves various testing criteria,
including those eligible for promotion, the testing topics and
questions, the use of assessment centers and the weights given to
the various elements of the testing and evaluation process•
7.

Based

upon

my

participation

in

the

1989

Sergeant

promotion process, which included screening applications to ensure
the

applicants

met

the minimum

requirements,

I have

personal

knowledge that every police officer who tested for Sergeant was
required to be off probation in order to be eligible to test.
8.
Personnel

Based on my experience as Civil Service Secretary and
Generalist,

I

have

personal

knowledge

that

police

officers are required to have at least one year of service with the
2

ii(i282

West Valley City Police Department prior to being removed from
probation,
9.

Based upon my experience as Civil Service Secretary and

Personnel Generalist, I have personal knowledge that Police Officer
is the rank immediately below Sergeant in the West Valley City
Police Department.
10.

Based on my experience as Civil Service Secretary and

Personnel Generalist, I have personal knowledge that the rank of
Police Officer in the West Valley City Police Department is divided
into grades known as Police Officer I, Police Officer II and Police
Officer III.
11.

The Civil Service Commission records in my possession

indicate that Officer Jim Crowley holds the rank and grade of
Police Officer II.
DATED this

)uf

day of August, 1991.

T

(AAJ,

Y ERflTN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
August, 1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC s
Residing at: 3^-<^

/*/- <&d—

day of

j
"
>, 0
7G^/fe^ L^hUsKt^f-^^

My Commission Expires:
^yC4^^

JRC:KH:ERVIN2.AFF
081491:F:PERS89-21(a)
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Exhibit H:

Affidavit of J. Stephen Shreeve

:UURT
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PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801)966-3600

BY

-r'iCT
hlY

S.'.

DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF J. STEPHEN SHREEVE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, J. SHEPHEN SHREEVE, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and
say as follows:
1.

I am currently employed as a police officer by West

Valley City, and have been so employed since July 1, 1980.

• U188

2.

My current position with West Valley City is Assistant

Police Chief, and I have held that position since 1987.
3.

As part of my duties as Assistant Chief, I participated

in formulating and administering the 1989 testing for promotion to
the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City Police
Department.
4.

On August 16, 1990, I was deposed by the Plaintiffs in

the above-entitled action with regard to my actions during the
formulation and conduct of the 1989 sergeants promotional process,
including the written test and materials, and the assessment
center.
5.

I am a dues-paying member of the West Valley Fraternal

Order of Police Lodge #4 (hereinafter FOP), and have been such
since the Lodge was formed.
6.

Immediately prior to my deposition on August 16, 1990, I

requested that the FOP provide me with legal counsel at the
deposition in order to protect my interests.
7.

The FOP refused to provide me with legal counsel at my

deposition because of a conflict of interest.
8.

I made a statement, on the record, regarding my request

for counsel and the conflict of interest at the commencement of my
deposition.
DATED this

/f" 7 ^

day of February, 1991.

¥
J/

STEPHEN SHREEVE

,.1)189

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g a t : S^Ot.

/9 £A-

" ~
~&^AUL~

day of

/
Ur-t^f^t^^^

My Commission Expires:
^9
$ " •

/9f^

<(&*$&.
/&

KAREN P HINCKLEY
Notary Public
|
STATE OF UTAH
' My Commission Expires
June 29. 1°94
JSOOConnMon Wes! Val :>> O-y !JT 84119

JRC:KH:SHREEVE.AFF
021591:F:PERS89-21
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Exhibit I:

Affidavit of Larry L. Moody

COURT
FEB h

S ic At; ^'j

PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801)966-3600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L. MOODY

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, LARRY L. MOODY, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say
as follows:
1.

I am currently employed as a police officer by West

Valley City, and have been so employed since October 20, 1980.

/U177

2.

My current position with West Valley City is Lieutenant,

and I have held that rank since 1987.
3.

As part of my duties as Lieutenant Chief, I participated

in formulating and administering the 1989 testing for promotion to
the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City Police
Department.
4.

On November 27, 1990, I was deposed by the Plaintiffs in

the above-entitled action with regard to my actions during the
formulation and conduct of the 1989 sergeants' promotional process,
including the written test and materials, the assessment center,
and the basic promotional standards.
5.

I am a dues-paying member of the West Valley Fraternal

Order of Police Lodge #4 (hereinafter FOP), and have been such
since the Lodge was formed.
6.

Immediately prior to my deposition on November 27, 1990,

I requested that the FOP provide me with legal counsel at the
deposition in order to protect my interests in this matter.
7.

The FOP refused to provide me with legal counsel at my

deposition.
DATED this

/^

day of February, 1991.

^nos^pr 1 Mooif
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC ,

~

Residing at: 5^C^

^ 9

^
-A^-^UL^

C^U^^t^JL^

'^lyUt^c^A

My Commission Expires:
^(/ix,

day of

/??</•
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STATE OF UTAH
y Commission Expires
June 29,1994

3600 Ccnstilutlon, West Vafley Cfy. UT 84119

JRC:KH:MOODY.AFF
021591:F:PERS89-21
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Exhibit J:

Affidavit of Terry Keefe

PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone: (801)966-3600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY KEEFE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, TERRY KEEFE, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as
follows:
1.

I have been employed as a Police Officer in the West

Valley City Police Department since October 20, 1980.

<i0278

2.

Since October 4, 1987, I have held the rank of Assistant

Chief in the Department.
3.

At the time of this deposition, Chief Dennis Nordfelt is

absent from the Department and I am Acting Police Chief of West
Valley City.
4.

I have personal knowledge that in the West Valley City

Police Department the rank immediately below Sergeant is the rank
of Police Officer.
5.

I have personal knowledge that only officers holding the

rank of Police Officer were promoted to Sergeant following the 1989
Promotional Examination.
6.

I have personal knowledge that the rank structure in the

West Valley City Police Department is set forth in the West Valley
City Police Manual at Section 1700. 23, and that a copy of this rank
structure is issued to every officer within the Department.
7.

I have personal knowledge that within the rank of Police

Officer there are three grades consisting of Police Officer I,
Police Officer II and Police Officer III.
8.

I have personal knowledge that job duties within the rank

of Police Officer are essentially similar, involve no supervisory
duties and do not vary based upon an officer's grade designation as
a P.O. I, P.O. II or P.O. III.
9.

I have personal knowledge that promotions in grade from

P.O. I to P.O. II within the rank of Police Officer are primarily
dependant upon the funds available in the Police Department budget

2
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and are not determined by a set number of positions within each
grade•

i.,/?

7^—

DATED thi

day of August, 19 91

TERRYKEEFE\

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
August, 1991.

"ydisu^k^

/?

/x-^t—

^ay

0f

v? ^ ^ c ^ ^ - >

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: ^^t^

.
TCA_^<L^

L-&U*4L£CA^,

My Commission Expires:

^V^C^u?, <%9

/<?94-

JRC:KH:KEEFE.AFF
081491:F:PERS89-21(a)
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Exhibit K:

Affidavit of Dennis J. Nordfelt
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PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone:
(801)966-3600

DEPUTY

CLKSK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J. NORDFELT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss .
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, DENNIS J. NORDFELT, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and
say as follows:
1.

I am currently employed by West Valley City as Police

Chief, and have been so employed since July of 1986.

"f'173

2.

I am a Defendant in the above-encaptioned lawsuit.

3.

I am a dues-paying member in good standing of the West

Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have been such
since June of 1987.
DATED this

/ fl^A

day of February, 1991.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991.

/ff/Ez--~

£ay

0f

^Ky^O^U^K^^
~F
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: jik^t- y£^JuL~. 0>c-t*^ru£^A^
My Commission Expires:

1/Ot^^-A ^
XSK&N.
KAREN P HINCKLEY
/v£oie£<&
Notary Public
$
STATE OF UTAH
' ?/ My Commission Expires
June 29,1994
3600 CcnstiWion, West Vafley City. l/T 84119

JRC: KH: NORDFELT. AFF
021591:F:PERS89-21
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Exhibit L:

Affidavit of Craig Gibson

?0UR1

PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT
84119
Telephone:
(801)966-3600

OEP'vTY JlCRX

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE # 4 ,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
A N D JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG GIBSON

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

I, CRAIG GIBSON, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as
follows:
1.

I am

currently

employed

as

a

police

officer

by

West

Valley City, and have been so employed since June 4, 1984.

"0182

2.

During the Summer of 1989, I participated in testing for

promotion to the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City
Police Department.
3.

As a result of the testing for promotion to Sergeant, I

am currently Number One on the sergeants' promotion list, and am
scheduled to be promoted to Sergeant on July 1, 1991.
4.

I am currently a dues-paying member in good standing of

the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have
been such since its inception at West Valley City.
5.
#4

If the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge

is granted

the relief

requested

in the above-encaptioned

lawsuit, I will be denied a promotion in rank and the accompanying
salary and benefit increase*
DATED this

v>^
fo~

day of February, 1991.

CRAIG GIBZuk

^O

/9 &—

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991.

NOTARY PUBLIC

.

R e s i d i n g a t : <2^LsOt~

day of

*
^-4^/LJ^

"

Ct-u^-du^-

My Commission Expires:
^yU^yue^

J9

/99V-

,#•—%
Ay^^'r&x
\£\

KAREN P HiNCMEY
Notary Public
STATE OF UTAH
v£\ t
| Js} My Commission Expires
vV-J>V
June 29,1994
m

~*-'-?.Vt"*''

3600 CcntttuHcn. Wes! Vrfley CfN. \JT 84119

JRC:KH:GIBSON.AFF
021591:F:PERS89-21
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Exhibit M:

Affidavit of Charles Illsley
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PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738
City Attorney
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
Telephone:

C

BY

_:

DFf .

•

rr,<

(801)966-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE LODGE #4,
a nonprofit Utah corporation,
AND JIM CROWLEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES ILLSLEY

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley
City Chief of Police, AND WEST
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Civil No. 89-0907667
Judge Leslie Lewis

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, CHARLES ILLSLEY, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say
as follows:
1.

I have been employed as a police officer with the West

Valley City Police Department since January 19, 1981.
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2.

During the Summer of 1989, I participated in the testing

process for promotion to Sergeant within the West Valley City
Police Department.
3.

On September 2, 1989, I was promoted to Sergeant in the

West Valley City Police Department,
4.

I am a dues-paying member in good standing of the West

Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have been such
since the Lodge was formed,
5.

If the relief requested by the Fraternal Order of Police

in the above-encaptioned lawsuit is granted, I will suffer a loss
of rank from Sergeant to Police Officer III, and may also suffer a

ft

loss of pay and benefit^.
DATED this

day of February, 19

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
February, 1991,

H-ttfo

day of

0OAteA^
NOTARY PUBLIC ^
,
Residing at: Z^XJjA

iMuk

My Commission E x p i r e s :
BARBARA HOLTRY
Notary Pubic
STATE OF UTAH
My CommMon Expires
November 2 1 . 1992
WOO ConrtUcn EM. WVC. UT14111

JRC:KH:ILLSLEY.AFF
021591:F:PERS89-21
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Exhibit N:

June 6, 1989, Promotion Announcement
Memorandum

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

__

\A/A/7

West Valley City

WW

POLICE DEPARTMENT

v^£

—

)

June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM
TO:

All Police Officers Eligible for Promotional
Examination - Sergeant

FROM:

Chief's Offi<dCj^ i i ^ y ^ ^ ^ —

RE:

Promotional Examination

T h i s memorandum i s t o n o t i f y o f f i c e r s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a
promotional examination f o r an immediate S e r g e a n t ' s p o s i t i o n and
t o e s t a b l i s h a r o s t e r . Passing grade for a l l t e s t s w i l l be s e t a t
75%.
A l l q u a l i f i e d a n d i n t e r e s t e d c a n d i d a t e s need t o a p p l y by
s u b m i t t i n g a to/from t o A s s i s t a n t Chief Shreeve i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r
i n t e r e s t and o u t l i n i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n s no l a t e r t h a n &xft&o&$c
^m4$i^4mu^^m^7M^Kiami^
NOON, ON MONDAY, JUNE 19, 1989.
QUALIFICATIONS :
Must have four years of police service (plus two additional
years police experience if substituting for college).
Must have two years of college (two years police experience
can be substituted).
Must be off probation.
Must have above averaoe performance evaluation.
WRITTEN 4 EXAMINATION:^
AIT

qualified 'canfliaares^wiuroe

g i v e n »vtWO, text

DOOKS

to

study from;30 daysi-prior to the, written examination. This
examination will "consist of management concepts taken from
this reference material, and will be the ONLY material
needed to study for this examination. There will be no
questions from the criminal code or the policy manual on the
exam.

-^

2470 South Redwood Road

West Valley City. Utah 84119 Phone (801) 974-5468

(/UflOft

Promotional Examination/Sergeant
June 6, 1989
Page 2

Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only.
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20,
1989.

ASSESSMENT CENTER:
Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the
written examination will be invited to attend a two-day
assessment center. The assessment center will be July 25th
and 26th# 1989.

Times and places for both the written examination and assessment
center will be announced later.

(»0007

Exhibit 0:

13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice
and
Procedure:
Jurisdiction
2d § 3531.9, pp. 617-23
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STANDING—RIGHTS OF OTHERS

§ 3531.9

the organization as representative is superior to an individual action.
Inquiry into the purpose of the organization also suggests
that some inquiry be made into the nature of the organization.
Some forms of organization may be more appropriate for representation than others. The cases, however, reflect little concern
with this possibility. Most cases involve representation by environmental, neighborhood, political action, or trade organizations
in traditional forms. The Hunt case involved a variation that
does not provide any general lessons. The Apple Commission
was a state agency, not a private association of the state growers and dealers. Examining the composition and activities of the
Commission, however, the Court concluded that it was indistinguishable from "a traditional trade association representing the
individual growers and dealers who collectively form its constituency/' 140 The general lack of attention to such matters may
reflect the fact that there are few problems. Nonetheless, it is
prudent to hold open the prospect that some forms of association
may not warrant the assumption of adequate representation that
is made for the more familiar forms. The greatest care should
be taken with associations whose members have little choice
whether to be members and have divergent interests. Like care
should be taken with organizations that ordinarily would not be
expected to undertake litigation on behalf of fheir constituents.
An ordinary commercial corporation, for example, generally
should not be permitted to borrow standing from injured stockholders.
The third prong of the test asks whether individual participation is required by the nature of the underlying claim or the relief sought.141 The most compelling need for individual participation is likely to occur when there are conflicts of interest, or
140.

Commission as association

97 S.Ct. at 2442, 432 U.S. at 345.
The Commission was composed of 13
apple growers and dealers. Apple
growers and dealers financed the
Commission by compulsory assessments, elected its members, and
were alone eligible to become members. The Commission promoted
the sale of Washington apples
through advertising, market research and analysis, and public education. It engaged in scientific research on uses for apples.

141. Individual participation
An association may be an appropriate
representative of its members "so
long as the nature of the claim and
of the relief sought does not make
the individual participation of each
injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause
* * V Warth v. Seldin, 1975, 95
S.Ct. 2197, 2212, 422 U.S. 490, 511,
45 L.Ed.2d 343.
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at least a divergence of views, between members of the organization or between the organization and its members. Several
cases deny organizational standing in such circumstances. 142
142.

well as its own interests are manifest.

Conflicting interests

The Women's Division of the Board of
Global Ministries of the United
Methodist Church lacked standing
to advance a Free Exercise challenge under the First Amendment
to the provisions of the Hyde
Amendment that prohibit Medicaid
funding of many medically necessary abortions. An organization
can assert the rights of its members
only if neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members.
The Women's Division had conceded
that there was a diversity of views
in its membership concerning the
matter of abortions, and that the determination of the advisability or
necessity of an abortion must lie in
the conscience of the individual before God. Free exercise claims,
moreover, require that the coercive
effect of the enactment be shown as
it operates against an individual in
the practice of his religion, so that
individual participation in the lawsuit must ordinarily be required.
Harris v. McRae, 1980, 100 S.Ct.
2671, 2690, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321,
65 L.Ed.2d 784.
Although the court did not speak of
conflicting interests, a good example is provided by the ruling that an
employer who has addressed antiunion speeches and letters to employees lacks standing to assert the
First Amendment rights of the employees. International Union, United Auto. Workers of America v.
Dana Corp., C.A.6th, 1982, 679 F.2d
634, 647. While employer and employees may have some common interests in sharing the communications, and employees may encounter
some difficulty in advancing their
own interests, the risks of allowing
the employer to purport to represent the interests of employees as

An association of general contractors
lacked standing to pursue claims
that its members were entitled to injunctive relief under the antitrust
laws against an agreement between
a firm building a major generating
plant and a number of unions that
would require any subcontractor to
negotiate with the unions as exclusive representatives of its employees. It was uncertain whether any
individual member would in fact
have standing. In addition, there
was no showing that the litigation
was germane to the organizational
purposes of the association. Finally, the claim asserted was one that
required participation of the members in the litigation in light of the
obvious conflict of interests among
the members. Some members
might benefit from enforcement of
the challenged agreement, while
others might be injured by it. The
fact that the members had voted
unanimously to file the action, before this antitrust theory was
articulated, did not alter this conclusion. Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co.,
C.A 8th, 1979, 611 F.2d 684.
An organization whose members included members of the police department that was being sued to obtain relief against asserted regular
use of unconstitutional force by
members of the department was
properly dismissed as a plaintiff, because a clear potential conflict of interest resulted from the possibility
that its police members might be adversely affected by the decision.
Calvin v. Conhsk, C.A.7th, 1975, 520
F.2d 1, 11. Other organizations
were allowed standing, but after
the Supreme Court vacated, 1976,
96 S.Ct. 1093, 424 U.S. 902, 47 L.Ed.
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Other cases have permitted standing after examination has dispelled the fear of conflict or has persuaded the court that the
conflict would not injure dissenting members. 143 It is possible
that cases may emerge in which it is practicable to reconcile the
risk of conflict by permitting organization standing coupled with
participation by individual members who represent the conflicting interests. It may be wondered, however, whether the concept of organization standing should be carried this far in preference to individual litigation by the members whose standing
might be borrowed.
Individual participation also may seem required because of
the need for specific fact information to illuminate the basis for
decision. In such circumstances, it is apt to prove best to deny
organization standing and to remit the organization to a role in
support of individual litigation.144 Organization standing is parprises, even if it be assumed that no
injury had accrued to its contractor
member who had secured a specific
job that had been denied to two other members who submitted lower
bids that did not meet the minority
business enterprise requirement.
Any conflict of interest among its
members did not limit its right to
represent injured members in a suit
for injunctive and declaratory relief.
The association would not function
as a class representative, and need
not adequately represent the interest of all members. The effect of
the association suit on its members
would be no different than the effect of a like suit brought by any
single member.
Rhode Island
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Kreps, D.C.R.I.
1978, 450 F.Supp. 338, 346-347 n. 3.

2d 307, standing was denied all
plaintiffs, C.A.7th, 1976, 534 F.2d
1251, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 1109,
424 U.S. 912, 47 L.Ed.2d 316.
143.

No injurious conflict

A union had standing to pursue employment discrimination claims on
behalf of its members. There was
nothing about the claims presented
that made it necessary that individual employees be made plaintiffs.
The counterclaim that had been
made against the union did not involve any matters that would create
a conflict of interest between the
union and its members. The union,
moreover, could act as a class representative despite the technical difficulty that it was not itself a member of the class
International
Woodworkers of America v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., C.A.4th,
1981, 659 F.2d 1259, 1266-1269.
National Constructors Assn. v. National Elec. Contractors Assn., D.C.
Md.1980, 498 F Supp. 510, judgment
modified C.A.4th, 678 F.2d 492, described in note 133 above.
An association of contractors had
standing to challenge a statutory
requirement that a portion of federal local public works grants be expended for minority business enter-

144. Individual fact need
See Harris v. McRae, 1980, 100 S.Ct.
2671, 2690, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321,
65 L.Ed.2d 784, described in note
142 above.
A society dedicated to the separation
of church and state had standing to
assert violation of its members' voting rights by a state constitutional
requirement that holders of public
office acknowledge the existence of
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Some substantive claims may seem inherently so personal
that individual participation should be required simply because
of the nature of the claim. A few courts, for example, have suggested that some civil rights claims should be brought directly
by the person injured, although it is difficult to support any general rule to this effect.146 The theory of organization representation is indeed stretched thin if it is extended to substantially
146.

C.A.5th, 1981, 638 F.2d 1272, 12761280, described in note 133 above.

Civil Rights claims

In Shaw v. Garrison, C.A.5th, 1977,
545 F.2d 980, 983 n. 4, reversed on.
other grounds 1978, 98 S.Ct. 1991,
436 U.S. 584, 56 L.Ed.2d 554, the
court noted that the question before
it was whether an action instituted
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 survived
in favor of the plaintiffs executor
following the plaintiffs death, and
that "[t]his is therefore not an attempt to sue under the civil rights
statutes for deprivation of another's
constitutional rights. Such suits
are impermissible. O'Malley v. Brierley, C.A. 3 Cir.1973, 477 F.2d 785;
Brown v. Board of Trustees of
LaGrange Indep. School Dist., 5 Cir.
1951, 187 F.2d 20." (per Wisdom,
J.).
Although welfare rights organizations
could achieve standing on the basis
of member injury to pursue general
federal question claims, and could
assert claims of interference with
rights of association deriving from
injury to their members, they could
not advance general claims arising
from injury to their members under
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Aguayo v.
Richardson, C.A.2d, 1973, 473 F.2d
1090, 1098-1101, certiorari denied
94 S.Ct. 900, 414 U.S. 1146, 39 L.Ed.
2d 101.
Compare
Standing has been allowed to pursue
§ 1983 claims based on injury to the
members of an organization plaintiff without further discussion. See
Church of Scientology v. Cazares,

Organization standing also has been
allowed without difficulty in actions
under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See International
Woodworkers of America v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., C.A.8th, 1977, 568
F.2d 64, 66-68, described in note 135
above.
Civil rights cases frequently involve
circumstances that justify remedies
in favor of nonparties without any
formal need to attribute standing of
members to an organization. As
one example, in Doe v. Gallinot,
C.A.9th, 1981, 657 F.2d 1017, 10241025, the plaintiff clearly had standing to challenge procedures under
which he had been involuntarily
committed seven times without a
hearing. It was found proper to implement the declaratory judgment
of invalidity by an injunction
against applying the procedures to
anyone. "The challenged provisions were not unconstitutional as
to Doe alone, but as to any to whom
they might be applied." Cases of
this sort frequently arise in determining the need for certifying a
class action; certification may be
denied on the ground that the scope
of the relief does not depend on the
character of the action.
Collectively, these decisions suggest
that there should not be a general
rule denying organization standing
in "civil rights" actions. Instead, it
is better to ask whether individual
participation is so important in a
particular case as to defeat organization standing.
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unique events affecting no more than a few people. Even if
more people are affected, it may be better to force litigation into
the formal representation procedures of a class action than to
rely on the vague representation theory of organization standing.
Once the three prongs of the Apple Commission test are satisfied, a few barriers may remain. The most obvious is that it is
not enough to show that an individual member would have
standing; the other requirements of justiciability must be met
as well. If the member's claim is not yet ripe or has become
moot, the organization cannot maintain suit.147 Procedural and
jurisdictional requirements also carry over from the member to
the organization. If a suit by the injured member would be
stayed in deference to a pending state proceeding, for example,
the same course may be taken with a suit by the organization.148
147.

Service summonses, because no
such summonses had yet issued, the
bank could not assert their rights.
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
1974, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 416 U.S. 21, 39
L.Ed.2d 812.

Ripeness and mootness

Both the problems of ripeness and
mootness are illustrated in Warth v.
Seldin, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 22142215, 422 U.S. 490, 516-517, 45
L.Ed.2d 343. One of the plaintiffs
was an organization of building
companies, claiming that restrictive
zoning ordinances had impaired
their business opportunities. The
Court denied standing based on
member injury upon concluding that
none of the members had such concrete building plans as to demonstrate a ripe claim. Another plaintiff was an organization of groups
that were involved in developing
low-cost housing. As to this plaintiff, one member had undertaken to
develop low cost housing in
Penfield, but had abandoned the
plan. The Court suggested that
had suit been brought at a time
close to this abandoned plan, the
member and the organization might
have had standing. As to a complaint filed three years later, however, it concluded that there was no
sufficient basis to infer that "a live,
concrete dispute" remained.
When bank depositors did not have
ripe claims to challenge bank recordkeeping requirements on the basis of possible Internal Revenue

148.

Abstention

Chief Justice Burger has explored at
length, in a separate opinion, the
question whether a union, complaining of unconstitutional interference with the organizational rights
of its members, should be able to invoke federal jurisdiction in circumstances in which federal courts
would defer to pending state criminal prosecutions of the individual
members. See Allee v. Medrano,
1974, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2208, 416 U.S.
802, 830-831, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (concurring and dissenting). He concluded that the union "stands in the
place of its prosecuted members
even as it asserts its own constitutional rights," since any other result
would permit an unwarranted evasion of federalistic deference. As
to the union's claim of interference
with its own constitutional rights to
communicate with others, this conclusion
seems
warranted—at
most—only if the union's rights cannot exist independently of the rights
of individual members. If there
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